

**JPRS 74675**

**29 November 1979**

# **West Europe Report**

**No. 1509**

**FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE**

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<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>		1. REPORT NO. JPRS 74675	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle WEST EUROPE REPORT, No. 1509			5. Report Date 29 November 1979	
7. Author(s)			6.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.			11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address  As above			13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
14.			15. Supplementary Notes	
16. Abstract (Limit 200 words)  This serial report contains political/economic information on West European energy, finance and trade policy matters as well as developments and trends in the doctrine, programs and problems of the major communist parties, including their relations with communist parties outside the West European area. The report also contains information on Theater Nuclear Forces and elections to the European Parliament.				
17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors				
Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> International Affairs	Iceland		
Sociology	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Austria	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Italy		
Propaganda	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Belgium	Luxembourg		
Economics	Canada	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Netherlands		
Energy	Cyprus	Norway		
Industry	Denmark	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Portugal		
Trade	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Federal Republic of	Spain		
Finance	Germany	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sweden		
Theater Nuclear Forces	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Finland	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Switzerland		
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> France	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Turkey		
	Greece	United Kingdom		
b. Identifiers/Open Ended Terms				
c. COSATI Field/Group 5C, 5D, 10				
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED		21. No. of Pages 125
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED		22. Price

29 November 1979

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## SALT II AGREEMENT CALLED DECEPTIVE

Paris LE FIGARO in French 21 Sep 79 p 2

[Text] Guarantees that U.S. experts find insufficient...Five essential but "forgotten" points... Soviet advancement for ground-to-air missiles... the Vietnam war trauma.

The U.S. has entered the presidential campaign period and it is expected that in the coming weeks both parties will expose scandalous "confidential" technical documents.

Carter's foreign and domestic policies are being closely examined. His main Republican opposition, Henry Kissinger, General Haig and Senator Goldwater, have launched their attack and--not to be left aside--Carter's partisans are joining the battle.

The time-released discovery of a Soviet brigade in Cuba, underlining the CIA's deficiencies (the agency has been severely shaken up by the politicians over the past years), the energy crisis, increasing inflation, and uncontrollable growth of a greedy bureaucracy are flagrant failures of the Carter Administration. In the event he cannot take care of all these problems, the President hopes after difficult negotiations with the Soviets, to present U.S. voters with a major trump card: agreement on the limitation of armaments, approved by a majority in Congress and duly ratified by Moscow and Washington--a strategic modus vivendi for the next 5 years, founded on the real control of mass destruction armaments. In short, a peace insurance which he could present as his.

The U.S. Senate's recent decision to postpone study and ratification of SALT II is not due to a political party's reaction, nor to political speculation connected with the presidential elections. Instead, this decision shows the concern of political and military men confronted with the insufficient guarantees of the agreement and the "looseness" surrounding some aspects of the treaty. This demonstrates the new intrasigence of U.S. legislators on nearly everything related to security and U.S. defense, whose pillars are peaceful coexistence and East-West nuclear balance.



By abandoning the "Kissinger" doctrine--always connecting SALT agreements with an obstinate detente policy--the Carter administration has deprived itself of "tight" bargaining possibilities with Moscow. The consequences are evident; because it did not get tough during SALT negotiations, the U.S. had to back off on all "hot" locations (Iran, African Afghanistan). Frenetic agitation from Fidel Castro, excited by repeated military success, is taking direct and more aggressive stands in South American, and could in the end present a threat for Mexico, the giant oil reservoir next to the U.S.

#### An Irresponsible Attitude

Despite agitation and risks, Carter maintains an irresponsible attitude and continued in disassociating the SALT discussions from the Cuban situation. The SALT II agreement--nobody tries to deny it on the other side of the Atlantic--shows progress in the process of negotiation and exchange of military information between the two powers, each of which wants to establish a ceiling (even if approximate) on the too costly, onerous and increasingly sophisticated race to armaments in which they have been engaged for more than 20 years.

But balanced numbers of ICBM's, SLBM's, ASBM's and intercontinental bombers, are hermetic denominations taken from technical language meant especially to reassure public opinion (limitation of strategic vectors to 2,400 to be brought down to 2,250 by January 1, 1981), seems like a "crooked outcome" in the eyes of American and foreign experts.

Thus, the SALT II agreement eludes or overlooks five technical points of major importance.

The "Backfire" considered by American and Soviet negotiators as a mid-range bomber (if it carries missiles with a 600km range) is in fact a dangerous strategic weapon with long-range penetration capabilities. From outposts it could easily reach cities like Rochester, New York, Pittsburgh, Little Rock or El Paso. Because it can be refueled in flight and carries AS.6 missiles, its potential is even greater. It could, with its missiles, hit targets as remote and sensitive as Washington, Chicago or Cleveland.

Finally, and principally, U.S. Air Force specialists point out that if it is used as "second striking force" against already damaged objectives (for example, ICBM's silos or buried P.C.) it would finish them off. The Soviets have about a hundred of these cruisers and will have doubled their number by 1982.

Prohibition of developing "fast reloading" systems in ICBM launching silos was not even brought up. Of course, it would have penalized only the USSR, which uses "cool launching" systems for some 330 SS17's and SS18's.

To accurately measure what that launching technique represents, specifics are necessary. During launching of a missile by a system relying on heat (such as the one used by the U.S.) the launchers of the missile are ignited while still in the silo. Combustion temperatures are very high (over 3,000 degrees C) and inflict serious damage to launching installations, requiring several days for repair and preventing their continued use. This serious inconvenience can be corrected with the "cool launching" system, a technique inspired by the method used in strategic submarines. The missile is pushed out of the launching tube by compressed air, and begins combustion about 30 meters above the ground, thus preventing damage to launching equipment.

Transposed and improved on the ground, the "cool launching" method allows the Soviets to install an underground fast reloading system using "barrels." This prevents military observation satellites from precisely determining the number of missiles actually deployed around each silo.

No limitation was set for SLBM's launched from submarines, nor for construction of new generation submarines. This voluntary omission favors the Soviets, who intend to make definite efforts to supply their navy with strategic submarines.

On the other hand, no article of SALT II expresses the reciprocal willingness of each party to slow development of anti-aircraft ground-to-air missiles. A definite imbalance against the Americans exists in this field. Increases and improvements in these types of missiles by the Soviets give them a means to get around the Vladivostok Agreement of 1974, regulating proliferation of anti-ballistic missile sites, and could, on a short-term basis, neutralize the capability of U.S. strategic missiles.

Finally, no mention is made of measures for protection of civilians, a matter that is the basis of dissuasion. The extent of Soviet programs in this field might in coming years place the U.S. in a seriously inferior position.

The present U.S. M.A.D. (Mutual Assured Destruction) strategy rests on a consensus: U.S. and Soviet willingness to assign hostage roles to their respective populations.

It means that each party should think twice before starting a nuclear conflict without warning, knowing that such action would expose its population to instant massive atomic retaliation.

Credibility of the U.S. doctrine of "nuclear balance" is based on two essential principles: "antiforces action," directed strictly against selected military objectives, and anticipated nuclear attack on large urban and industrial centers. If one of these two principles collapses because the enemy finds a way to annihilate it, the whole dissuasion collapses. For 2 years now the Soviets have strengthened their defenses and equipped all

their airports with subterranean installations. Gigantic tunnels and shelters, ~~about~~ to be completed, could absorb civilians from the biggest cities in a matter of minutes. After a series of delays, the U.S. Congress will probably ratify SALT II following the loose ~~maxim~~ which says that an approximate agreement is better than no agreement at all.

#### Political Weakness

A pause offered in the race to armaments cannot be declined. But Americans and their Western allies must be careful that Washington does not attach exaggerated importance to this intermission and its effects, to conclude naively that it will slow the formidable Soviet war machine for any length of time. The superiority in hardware and men of the Red Army and its satellites over NATO is devastating. The determination of Soviet leaders has been proved many times.

The U.S. maintains constant technological advances in its laboratories, computers and weapon systems. But it remains confused by the enormous defeat it suffered in Vietnam, the trauma of which is still felt. Its prodigious scientific and human resources allowed it, despite a 5-year handicap, to surpass the Soviets and reach the moon, to have astronauts walk on it, to bring them back without complications, and to end their program before any Soviet had walked on the moon—even while Soviet spacecraft and their crews continue to orbit at 4,000 km from earth and 296,000 km from the moon! The main weakness of the U.S. today lies entirely in the erosion of its ability to make political decisions.

8924

CSO: 3100

TACTICAL NUCLEAR AIR SQUADRON GOING TO ISTRES

Paris LE MONDE in French 21-22 Oct 79 p 7

[Article: "The Fifth Tactical Nuclear Air Squadron Will Be Based At Istres (Bouches-du-Rhone)"]

[Text] The Fifth Tactical Nuclear Air Squadron of the Tactical Air Force will be stationed at Istres Air Base (Bouches-du-Rhone), according to the Air Army Headquarters which further states that it will become operational in 1980.

It was last 18 September that Defense Minister Yvon Bourges had announced before the Defense Commission of the National Assembly the creation of this new squadron made up of Jaguars. Each squadron is 15 planes.

To this day, the Air Army disposes of four squadrons of planes capable of dropping a tactical nuclear bomb of the 15-20 ton range (about the same energy level created by the explosion of the Hiroshima bomb).

Two squadrons of Mirage III-E are stationed at Luseuil (Haute-Saone) and two Jaguar squadrons are already stationed at Saint-Dizier (Haute-Marne).

1751

CSO: 3100



## SECOND CHAMBER OPINIONS ON NATO NUCLEAR WEAPONS SCRUTINIZED

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 27 Oct 79 pp 14-18

[Report on interview with minister of national defense, Willem Scholten, in Amersfoort by correspondents Rene de Bok and Frank Lafort: "CDA Nuclear Bomb Under the Cabinet": date not given]

[Text] The atmosphere around the political dispute about the modernization of NATO nuclear weapons is threatening. The Van Agt cabinet is trembling; in the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal], the combatants are getting angry; and in NATO the Netherlands is playing the role of misfit with partners who consider the nuclear assignments unavoidable. The main absentee in the war of words is minister of national defense, doctor of laws, W. Scholten. In a speech to Christian historical youth in Amersfoort he broke the oppressive silence: "The security of our democratic society can only be guaranteed by a stable alliance system with a credible defense." Plain speaking, but it illustrates the political isolation of the CDA defense minister. In Amersfoort, Elsevier had at the very least a disarming interview with a minister who knows he has his back to the wall.

"An end must come to the arms race, if humanity wants to survive. Therefore the Netherlands will try, when and where the opportunity appears, to take effective measures to control and reduce armament." This is a section of the governing agreement of the Van Agt cabinet, which for a considerable part of the CDA group in the Second Chamber, conflicts with the desire of Defense Minister Scholten to agree to NATO plans

for the modernization of the nuclear weapons system. Scholten questions that difference. Control and reduction of armament; yes but "the problems of increasing armament are so complicated that a simple declaration in favor of unilateral reduction of further armament or modernization cannot lead to a solution. However tempting it may be to simply say no, you actually shift the responsibility to others, in so doing. Moreover, conceiving the world as different from what it is would indicate a lack of realism."

Scholten does not hide the fact that he will prevent the Netherlands from becoming alienated from its NATO partners at any price. He describes the importance of a united Atlantic front, on one hand, from the standpoint of the influence which the Netherlands could exercise as an active, full partner and the threats of the Russians on the other hand. "We are in a situation where nuclear weapons and the knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons are a fact; and you cannot change such a fact overnight. It would not be desirable if we would minimize the role of nuclear weapons by means of unilateral measures, both with respect to the Warsaw Pact as well as unilaterally by the Netherlands with respect to our allies. As regards the first, the stability of this world would be seriously threatened and consequently world peace. As regards the second, our influence in the armament control process, also desired by our allies, would decline so much that, in so doing we would put the cart before the horse, regarding the central goal of our policy."

Reservations about the intentions of the Soviet Union do not make Scholten the champion of the disarmament race. "Whether the Warsaw Pact also is considering the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons is a very difficult question to answer. The efforts with which the Soviets have consoled themselves in recent years in the field of the Euro-strategic system, however cannot be regarded as a mere modernization of existing potential. Especially because of the lack of free democratic discussion in the Warsaw Pact, it is difficult to determine intentions and we must rely on what we really see. And what we see, for example, is a display of military might on Brezhnev's visit to East Berlin. A display of power which is not equalled in the West. Brezhnev's statement that the number of Russian middle range nuclear launching sites aimed at Western Europe has not been increased at all in the last 10 years, may well be true, but in the first place it is not a question of the number of launching sites, but the number of nuclear warheads. It is generally recognized that with the

newly introduced missiles such as the SS-20--which have three nuclear charges per missile--many more targets can be reached than with the old system. If we assume that the Soviets are not so demanding as we are about reducing the role of nuclear weapons, then we must understand well that they are tough negotiators, who want to negotiate about concrete facts. The SALT negotiations have definitely shown this."

Scholten's position is isolated both internationally as well as nationally. The developments in the Netherlands are watched with Argus eyes and ears in NATO circles. The Netherlands is regarded as the weak spot in the NATO united front. Brzezinski, the leading American adviser in security matters, said with an undertone of threat: NATO now faces a choice; whether to act effectively now or to be lulled to sleep and be doomed to passivity and increasing vulnerability. The decision is up to the parliaments. Are they ready to pay the political price for the infinitely more expensive alternative: in the most favorable case, intimidation and in the most unfavorable, war."

Scholten shows readiness in the NATO alliance to accept nuclear responsibility for the Netherlands; in return for American involvement in the defense of Western Europe: "The American guarantees to let its European partners also seek refuge under the American atomic umbrella do not imply that the Europeans can continue to sit with their arms folded in the nuclear field.

In his efforts to fit the Netherlands neatly into NATO ranks, Scholten is meeting opposition, especially from his own CDA party members, in the national estimate. The CDA defense specialists, J. de Boer and A. Frinking, are representatives of the anti-modernization lobby which opposes beforehand the introduction of new nuclear weapons in the European field of fire. Their position is to increase armament control: first negotiate with the Russians and then--if necessary--take measures, not vice versa.

Frinking says: "In the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons, it does not involve replacement of obsolete systems, but expansion with new systems. We are still thinking too much in old ways. I do not favor unilateral disarmament. But NATO proceeds from the deterrent theory. Almost nothing has still been done with detente. The logic of the deterrent theory assumes that a missile with three atomic warheads has more destructive power than a missile with one atomic warhead. But the fact is that the end is already in sight, if you

launch one atomic warhead. We talk about security systems which destroy what we want to protect. Brezhnev has made an unusual offer. It would be very unworthy of the West not to first investigate its merit. We can always decide later that it was an empty gesture. But the damage is then always greater for the Soviet Union than for the West.

His colleague, J. de Boer asks for more understanding of the Russian anxiety neurosis: "In the Soviet view, the NATO member states still have a great advantage both economically as well as technologically. The gap is becoming greater instead of smaller. The Soviet Union is doomed to run panting behind the West. Therefore, we must realize that the Soviet Union interprets the NATO measures quite differently. We must not directly reject Brezhnev's offer, although this leader wins no prize for the clearest conscience. But the Soviet Union knows that they are behind and that in the long term they are bound to lose. Therefore, the Russians have more to gain from detente."

Prinking says: The problem is what negotiation formula do you choose for discussion with the Russians? One possibility is that you say to the Russians: you stop further development of the SS-20, then we will not expand our systems further. But as a bargaining card: then in the period 1981-1983, you must have made so much progress with it, otherwise we in the West will be forced to introduce our new systems. For the Americans naturally are continuing quietly with the development of new weapons.

But not only Prinking and De Boer object to a quick fundamental decision to replace NATO nuclear weapons, other CDA members also give evidence of that. The atomic pacifist and deputy chairman of the CDA Second Chamber group, Hans de Boer, is violently opposed to it; nor does Houwelingen have much enthusiasm for Scholten's plans; and even the group leader, Lubbers, is taking a new course. He recognizes the real threat of the Russian atomic weapons, but he says: "We should not let it go so far that more modern, newer nuclear weapons are again set up here, while the negotiations only aim at establishing a ceiling somewhere in the future, at a much higher level. We must essentially aim the limitation at zero. Consequently we must not set up as many weapons as possible and then negotiate and see whether some kind of a ceiling can be found."

Dissension is rife about the modernization of nuclear weapons: a majority of the ADA [Advisory Council on Defense Matters] in which former chamber members and representatives from business



and the trade union movement are seated, will advise Minister Scholten on short notice to approve the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe. The ADA members studied last week a nuclear weapons modernization report of a committee headed by former KVP [Catholic People's Party] Second Chamber member, doctor of laws, Joop van Elzen. Prominent members of this club are former secretary of state for foreign affairs, prof, doctor of laws Kooijmans, the former chamber members, Hans van Mierlo and Hannie van Leeuwen, besides Prof Victor Halberstadt, Doctor of Laws Heldring, prof, doctor of laws P.J. Teunissen and H.J. Neuman. The last two are the writers of the CDA report, Peace and Security. The advisory committee on questions of disarmament, international security and peace, which reports directly to the minister of foreign affairs, will also submit soon (under the chairmanship of the Tilburg Professor Alting von Geusau) a divided opinion on nuclear weapons. Here, also, a majority is for modernization and a minority is opposed to it.

In christian democratic circles, Scholten is getting some support from the authors of the CDA report, prof, doctor of laws P.J. Teunissen and H.J. Neuman. But for the minister of defense, that support has a bitter aftertaste, because precisely this report was criticized in its own circles as a "conservative document."

The prospects for Minister Scholten do not appear very encouraging in the Second Chamber: A chamber majority of the PvdA [Labor Party], part of the CDA and D'66 [Democrats '66] wants to connect the decision about the new atomic weapons with the approval of SALT-2--limitation of heavy strategic weapons--in the American Senate. The refinement which Prime Minister Van Agt has introduced--the Netherlands government will not commit itself unconditionally in December to a NATO decision to station new middle range atomic missiles in the Netherlands as long as SALT-2 is not ratified--is regarded with suspicion by the PvdA, D'66 and the CDA left wing. There they still support the motion of Van de Stoel, De Boer and Brinkhorst, which is interpreted as a decision to refrain from the production and introduction of the new Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles, pending the conversations with the Soviet Union. The impression prevails on the left that ministers Scholten and Van der Klaauw are developing a strategic plan to inveigle the Second Chamber via a labyrinth of clauses and conditions into a fundamental decision about modernization of nuclear weapons. In Amersfoort Minister Scholten cannot completely dissipate the impression that a clever manipulation is in the air. He now gives ELSEVIER

the impression that the final proposals to the Second Chamber probably would contain a specimen of the art of formulation. Politically perhaps not such a drastic expression, in view of the rather heated chamber discussion which still awaits him in the middle of December in this nuclear weapons matter.

Aside from his clear and sensible argument about the views and motivations of the cabinet with regard to weapons control of tactical nuclear weapons, there appears in the background besides the need for a somewhat too emphatic justification of his own policy, a definite irritation about the criticism which he has encountered in recent weeks. Justification of his own policy predominates as he wonders: "Are the Netherlands government and especially the ministers of foreign affairs and defense developing sufficient initiatives to shape the main objective of the governing agreement regarding reduction of the role of nuclear weapons?" And then he points out three indications of a continuing policy:

A positively received Netherlands proposal in NATO to decide in the future about the modernization and replacement of nuclear weapons systems, to be evaluated in three aspects:

First: The need for the weapons to maintain NATO's deterrent capacity and security;

Second: To view the results of introduction from the standpoint of weapons control;

Third: The existence of a good conventional alternative.

The Netherlands has been successful in assuring itself a regular place in the NPG [Nuclear Planning Group]. "By that means, we will always be able to take part in the future in conversations on the political level in all NATO forums about these nuclear problems. When my colleague, Van de Klaauw and I began our activities in the early part of this year to obtain this regular place, various experts said to us: You will never succeed in that; that subject is so firm; it has already been like that more than 10 years and no change has taken place in it--the NPG will meet in The Hague for the first time next November in its new setup, with the Netherlands as a regular member. That is a result which I certainly am not ashamed of.

Scholten said about the activities connected with making decisions about the modernization of nuclear weapons: "And it

certainly does not escape our allies that a cabinet is in power now in the Netherlands which has included as a goal in its political principles: reduction of the role of nuclear weapons.

Scholten was not able to conceal irritation about criticism at Amersfoort. In so doing, he directs the dagger of his rage both at the CDA and the IKV [Interdenominational Peace Council] as well as the PvdA. "Various persons in the CDA have said out loud in recent weeks that in the matter of the modernization, whether the Van Agt cabinet and the coalition with the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] continues to last can and may not be decisive. Leaving that position completely for the consideration of those who have expressed it, I want to add the following to that: whoever speaks too much about the continued existence of the cabinet and coalition can conjure up the danger of a self-fulfilling prophesy. It would appear wise to me for party and parliament not to evoke any atmosphere of wars or rumors of wars, but only to agree on a definite position when all important factors are known and one can determine how the government has really operated in this matter..."

"I plead for a careful analysis of all the consequences of this unbelievably important decision for the association in the alliance. Consequences not only on the military-strategic level, but especially on the foreign policy level and with respect to the cabinet's main goal regarding nuclear weapons. Whoever isolates himself in the alliance in the field of nuclear weapons, irrevocably loses his political influence. Whoever sponges on others, fails to recognize his own responsibility for peace and security."

Scholten says about the protests from the Interdenominational Peace Council and the Netherlands Reformed Church, that NATO involves "peace, prevention of war and not 'arming'. Unfortunately, the IKV attempts in one of its latest writings to suggest that this 'arming' could be the political goal of this minister. I have learned about that suggestion with sorrow. Sorrow that christians think they have to talk this way. Sorrow that also members of the Netherlands Reformed Church, in which I am an active member, take responsibility for this."

The PvdA also has a fling at it: "In view of military development on the part of the Warsaw Pact, we have agreed to eliminate some weak spots in our defense for the sake of maintaining that so essential stability in NATO. Aiming at a yearly real

increase of defense expenditures of approximately 3 percent is a means for that purpose. Implementation of defense report 1979 which the PvdA group in the Second Chamber published, would again undo the allied agreement. The PvdA comes to the conclusion, on the basis of old statistical data, that money is left in defense and it can well be saved. That is wrong thinking. In addition, they acted in a rather arbitrary manner regarding investments, after the previous cabinet had precisely called for improving the investment percentage. Weak spots which were gradually corrected with much effort, are again revealed, using the magic formula of defensive strategy. As if we are busy building up an aggressive apparatus! An old economy trick is again used in the PvdA report. Just as this was done in the defense report 1977 for the Den Uyl cabinet, savings through reduction of the armed forces as a result of successful MBFR [Mutual and balanced force reductions] with the Warsaw Pact (conversations between East and West about mutual troop reductions in Europe) are now taken into account again. The Den Uyl Cabinet had to again cancel that saving yearly, with a supplementary budget, because MBFR successes failed to appear. The present cabinet, which hopes no less for good results from the MBFR consultations, estimates on the basis of the current strength of our armed forces and readjusts those estimates, as reductions appear in connection with MBFR. That is a more realistic approach than that people keep savings, which no one knows when they can become a reality." In the interview with ELSEVIER the excitement in the arguments of the minister, who feels driven to the wall, is obvious.

[Question] The minister of national defense shall not commit himself unconditionally to NATO modernization without ratification of SALT-2 in the US Senate. Consequently, under conditions, what are you thinking of then?

[Answer] I do not think of anything more or anything less than what the prime minister has outlined.

[Question] Do you consider the criticism from your own circle, the Netherlands Reformed Church, as a stab in the back?

[Answer] I wonder if we as Christians must treat each other this way. Perhaps I must interpret the criticism as an indication that the IKV is too politically oriented.

[Question] And the CDA criticism?



[Answer] I do not react to statements of CDA chamber members, except when they are directed to me in parliament. I speak with parliament via parliament. With my remark, I have only wanted to express a concern.

[Question] Do you fear the self-fulfilling prophesy of the cabinet crisis which the CDA is persuading itself about? Otherwise you would not hammer at it so much?

[Answer] The hammering is again from you, just as the remark that I supposedly have devoted so much attention to it. My speech lasted an hour, while this passage about the CDA criticism did not last more than a minute, twenty seconds. Right, I have, like everybody, heard certain criticisms. And since I consider it important that the cabinet, if it is only somewhat possible, serves the period for which it is designated, I want to say: parliament make a decision about the modernization of NATO nuclear weapons, when everything is known.

[Question] The minister of internal affairs, Wiegel, has meanwhile indicated that he does not consider nuclear weapons worth a cabinet crisis.

[Answer] What I have said about discussions applies even more so for the discussion with cabinet colleagues: which I am conducting with the persons involved myself.

[Question] You describe the Netherlands as the pivot around which the final NATO discussions on nuclear weapons turn. Are the European capitals watching for the Netherlands Parliament's decision.

[Answer] It is a decision of us all, but we all have our own responsibility in that.

A productive exchange of views with the minister hardly appears possible on the eve of the chamber discussions about the modernization of nuclear weapons in the NATO alliance. On his entrance in the Van Agt Cabinet, chamber members of various political views praised Scholten as a strong, steady administrator with much authority. As the replacement for Doctor of Laws Roelof Kruisinga, prime minister Van Agt intended to find in Scholten a defense minister, who would not develop in a nuclear weapons discussion into an obstructionist of cabinet plans. This intention appears to have succeeded: Scholten appears completely loyal regarding cabinet policy. In Amersfoort he placed a philosophers' stone before the christian historic youth. His arguments are now strong trumps in the chamber discussion. But meanwhile the danger is not inconceivable that, with his bitter words about CDA critics and the PvdA, he has created so much animosity, that his outspokenness will turn an individual minister against this policy.

## GAPS IN NATO NUCLEAR ARMAMENT SCRUTINIZED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 24 Oct 79 p 5

[Text] Brussels, mid-October. The Atlantic alliance was surprised by the Soviet "peace offensive." On the basis of previous experience they had of course expected an initiative, but the precision of the proposals presented by Brezhnev in his East Berlin speech in early October was astounding. In the meantime the complicated machinery at NATO headquarters in Brussels has been busy with the quantitative, qualitative, and political assessment of the Moscow move. Preliminary assessment in Brussels shows a relatively great coherence, which must not be thoroughly discussed with member states from the point of view of internal policy.

## Repeat of a Familiar Tactic

The Atlantic alliance was already discussing the stockpiling of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles in Western Europe in 1957. At that time Khrushchev tried to hinder a NATO decision with a political chess move similar to that of Brezhnev today. Nevertheless, or perhaps in order not to create an impression of yielding and weakness, the basic, positive decision was made in NATO Council of Ministers in Paris in December. At that time the communique justified the decision by saying that NATO could not accept Moscow's attitude, that except for the Soviet Union all nations in Europe would have renounced nuclear weapons and rockets without waiting for comprehensive disarmament efforts.

Now, 22 years later, Brezhnev, encouraged by the political debate in Western Europe over the stationing of the American "neutron weapon," tried in his East Berlin speech a politically clever approach to undermine the cohesiveness of the alliance. In NATO a decision on the stationing of "Eurostrategic" nuclear weapons in Western Europe is impending in the next few months. The mixture of advance concession, restriction, and threat in the offer from the East has the double objective of blocking the decision-making mechanisms of NATO in nuclear policy and of influencing the general nuclear debate in the FRG and in other European NATO countries.

Because of repeated statements by the Bonn government that a stationing of modern American nuclear weapons on German soil will be agreed to only

if one other NATO country, for example in the Benelux area, does the same, an internal connection exists between the two elements. The latest Soviet efforts aim at internal party disputes of the Social Democrats, stiffen the backs of the "Greens" in the FRG, and gamble on exploiting the nuclear policy sensitivity of the population in the Netherlands. Whether the Atlantic alliance can confirm the solidity it displayed 20 years ago will be decided in this polygon of political current.

#### Starting Position

The basis of the internal search for a decision in NATO will necessarily be the actual starting position with regard to the "Eurostrategic" nuclear weapons and development potential in the framework of the contemplated arms limitation negotiations of SALT III. The European NATO countries insist on an overall consideration of the problem, in which the political decision of what steps are to be taken and to what extent is not decided beforehand. While for example, the Netherlands would rather negotiate from a position of a "peaceful nuclear policy blank," others say that more advantageous results are to be reached from a negotiating position of strength in defense and counterattack. All are agreed that future SALT III negotiations on limitation of the so-called "gray zone weapons" should be conducted on the Western side by the United States alone. It is nevertheless assumed that there will be an early and close consultation among the Alliance partners in the NATO organs available for this purpose, which should take the place of merely giving a hearing to the partners as during the SALT II phase. This political demand is justified by the tasks which would have to be assumed by the European NATO partners, for example in the case of stationing or in financing infrastructures.

Within the scope of SALT III the Soviet Union possesses at present, according to information available in Brussels, some 1,370 medium-range nuclear weapons systems for use in Europe. Almost half of these are rockets. The roughly 400 somewhat older SS-4 with a range of 1,900 kilometers and 120 SS-5's with a range on the order of 4,000 kilometers have been expanded and perhaps later replaced by the more accurate and mobile SS-20 with 3 warheads and a range of over 4,500 kilometers. Of this modern nuclear weapon perhaps 100 have been put in place, and it is estimated that 50 more will be introduced annually. The modernization will be accompanied by a slight reduction in the number of launching ramps, but this reduction is more than compensated by the multiple warheads and reloading capability. Because of its greater range the SS-20, even from firing positions behind the line of the Urals, can cover the whole European NATO area (with the exception of Portugal) with relatively great accuracy. This precision makes possible a reduction of throw weight without real loss of effectiveness in the target area.

The Soviet Union likewise lays great emphasis on the modernization of its roughly 750-unit fleet of medium-range bombers and heavy fighter bombers with nuclear capacity. The approximately 650 aging bomber models

Badger, Blinder, and Fencer have been undergoing replacement by the swing-wing Backfire bomber since 1975. About 80 of these modern aircraft of high payload and a range on the order of 4,200 kilometers are now deployed, and up to 30 more will be put into service yearly.

At the present time the Atlantic Alliance, with its 386 nuclear-capable medium-range systems, has nothing even roughly equivalent with which to match the East. For a long time the United States has no longer stationed nuclear rocket systems in Western Europe for medium-range purposes; there are now about 150 heavy American F-111 fighter bombers stationed on British soil. The atom power of Great Britain rests on 64 aging Polaris missiles with relatively wide radius of accuracy and about 50 Vulcan medium-range bombers. The Alliance member France, which left the integrated NATO military command and is not included in NATO planning, possesses over 18 rocket units in its force de frappe [striking force] stationed in the Massif Central, and due to their limited range they cannot penetrate very far into the East European space; in addition 4 strategic submarines with 64 rockets and 40 medium-range Mirage-IV bombers are available.

#### Maintaining the Deterrent

This hasty comparison of the nuclear medium-range potential shows that the Atlantic Alliance has nothing comparable with which to oppose the Eastern side. Western defense must first of all rest on the total picture of its deterrent strength, in the nuclear field particularly on the American intercontinental nuclear umbrella. Limitation agreements here have been worked out in SALT I and II between the two superpowers. Regardless of the outcome of the American SALT II ratification process the achievement of an effective security policy relationship in the "Eurostrategic" nuclear development area between the United States and the Soviet Union is of decisive importance. Two committees of the Alliance, one in the framework of the long-range NATO program and a second composed of high-ranking national officials assigned especially to disarmament policy have studied these questions in detail in recent months. Their proposals are now in the national capitals and will be taken up on the political level by the defense ministers at the November meeting of the nuclear planning group (NPG). It is hoped that some main guidelines can be decided in the second week of December at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

#### Negotiation Offer to Moscow

The planned NATO reinforcement is to be linked to an offer to Moscow to negotiate mutual limitations. In no event should the presently existing imbalance be endorsed. The NATO goal is said not to be the attainment of numerical balance in the number of warheads, but rather a long-term credible deterrent in this field of weaponry in which something qualitatively comparable to the modern Soviet "Eurostrategic" nuclear armament is set up against it. In Washington it is said that the military experts would regard the stationing on Western European soil of 464

American cruise missiles and 108 likewise American Pershing 2 medium-range rockets with single warheads and a range of about 2,000 kilometers as an adequate expression of this intention. In the Brussels concept these figures still have no conclusive validity.

In European NATO circles interest in an early arms control negotiation in the framework of SALT III is not concealed. At the same time it freely pointed out that even with an early basic decision in NATO agencies on improvement of the nuclear medium-range armament of the alliance, the first new systems can hardly be deployed before 1983. Until the actual execution of the NATO project in the form of stationing and installation of new nuclear weapons there remains in any case enough time for substantial negotiations with the Soviet Union, in which Moscow can demonstrate the value of Brezhnev's "peace offensive." In the Brussels headquarters of NATO the opinion seems now to prevail among the alliance partners--without France--that NATO in any case needs a "minimal equipment" of medium-range nuclear systems, in order to make talks which would be constructive from the viewpoint of security policy appear constructive at the conference table.

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CSO: 3103



## ARMAMENTS COOPERATION, EUROPEAN DEFENSE DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 27 Sep 79 pp 1, 8

[Article by Correspondent Philippe Lemaître: "France and the European Institutions:"]

[Text] In Strasbourg the discussion which got under way on Tuesday [25 September 1979] in the European Assembly on cooperation in the field of armaments was scheduled to be concluded on Wednesday 26 September by a vote. Two deputies (one British and one German) having asked the European Commission whether it planned "to establish contact with NATO" to draw up joint armament programs, the Commission [Commission of the European Communities] prudently answered through Etienne Davignon, noting that defense did not fall under the jurisdiction of the community but that European cooperation in the field of armaments could be effective. The discussion which followed—and in which Georges Marchais (French Communist Party) and Pierre Messmer (Rally for the Republic) took part—could have ended inconclusively if the former prime minister [Messmer] had not taken the initiative to force a vote by requesting the assembly to state clearly that in its opinion the commission does not have the jurisdiction "to establish contact with NATO" for the purpose of drawing up armament programs.

Furthermore, in Luxembourg, the European Court of Justice enjoined France to lift the restrictions that it had imposed since 1978 on the import of sheep originating from Britain.

Strasbourg.—Two issues took up the bulk of the European Assembly's time on Tuesday, 25 September 1979—arms cooperation - ' Europe's defense; and the export of butter and in a more general way the evolution of joint agricultural policy.

The discussion on "the community programs of arms supplies within the framework of industrial policy" raised by the oral question of E.A.J. Fergusson (Conservative Party, Britain) and Kai-Uwe von Hassel (Christian Democrat, Federal Republic of Germany) took place on Tuesday afternoon.\*

\* The elected members of the RPR [Rally for the Republic—France], the French communists, and French Socialists as well as Edgar Faure and Andre Rossi, both of them elected on the slate of Mrs Simone Veil, opposed the discussion of this item.

Each of the protagonists played the role assigned to him. Georges Marchais and Pierre Messmer, whose filmed speeches were very well attended, were for a few moments the stars of the assembly. There were no outbursts nor the beginnings of a dialog.

The vote on a resolution proposal presented by the European democratic progress group (made up mostly of the RPR) was postponed till Wednesday [26 September]. The text of the proposed resolution, reschoing the very terms of the question raised by Mr Fergusson and Mr von Hassel, stated: "The assembly feels that the commission does not have the jurisdiction to establish contact with NATO nor the competent departments of the member-states in order to draw up community programs for the supply of armaments."

E.A.J. Fergusson, taking cognizance of "the storm of publicity" caused by his initiative, first explained "that there is no hidden motive in our question warranting the fears expressed." Etienne Davignon, commissioner charged with industrial policy, speaking with great prudence, reiterated the traditional position of the Commission: "It is quite clear that defense problems are not covered by the Treaty of Rome.

The cooperation which is envisioned in the field of armaments falls precisely in the context of actions undertaken to strengthen the industrial potential of the Nine Community members. There is not even a question of trying to lay the bases of genuine global community programs of military equipment production but simply ascertaining that cooperation among European industries, including in the field of armaments, is as efficient and stimulating as possible.

With the exception of Mr Jackson (Conservative Party, Britain) who, speaking without measuring his words, said that the European Parliament was at times qualified to discuss questions of defense "since the preamble (of the Treaty of Rome) mentions the pooling of our resources in order to protect the peace . . . .," the many speakers who spoke fell into three categories.

There were first those who considered that the attitude of those who brought up the question and the parliamentary groups which supported them was hypocritical and that in fact what both wanted was to broach defense policy at the community level. They felt that the wording of the question --it was admittedly provocative since the question was raised whether the commission "intends to establish contact with NATO"--was revealing in this respect.

Then there are those who, finding the noise made by the Gaullists and communists about this issue untimely and artificial, believed in the need for cooperation in armaments but claimed not to have any political-institutional afterthoughts on the competence on the community.

The third group (it is principally the Socialists but also the Italian communists who were involved) was made up of those irritated and embarrassed

by this discussion. They were not necessarily hostile to industrial cooperation in the field of armaments but they believed that some matters were more urgent and that the European Parliament had better things to do than debate the issue

#### Georges Marchais: The Distressing Path of an Armed Europe

Georges Marchais, who appeared in the European Assembly in Strasbourg for the first time, sounded his keynote right away when he said: "In the name of the French Communist Party I wish to voice an official protest against the serious decision taken to debate community programs for the supply of armaments in this assembly. This fact is very significant in itself. Indeed, it is precisely those who for months have made public opinion believe that Europe at this time is the Europe of social progress and peace who are in the forefront today to bring us back to the distressing path of an armed Europe.

"This decision obviously reflects a clear intention for most of you: That of engaging by this means in the debate on the organization of common defense. In other words, at a time which should be that of detente and disarmament you in contrast envision the constitution of new grist for a European army with the possibility thus open for the Federal Republic of Germany to have access to atomic weapons."

Early in the year, Georges Marchais continued, among French political parties only the communists had the courage to broach the problem of European defense. The others, "as shameful integrationists, then resolved to advance wearing masks.

"Today," Marchais continued, "with the electoral verdict in, some of them feel that the path is finally open to try adventure. It seems clear at present that it is undoubtedly through the detour of European arms production that the partisans of military integration wish to succeed in involving France in the establishment of European defense and army.

"We communists do not plan to dilute France in a supranational entity, we do not plan to tie our country's security to the decisions of a supranational majority, we do not plan . . . [source garbled]. Here is the reason why we do not agree to this assembly's right to deal with such an issue. We are unquestionably witnessing the initial attempt to expand the powers of this assembly since the elections of 10 June."

At times some noise was heard during Georges Marchais' speech. "Demagog," some shouted, but it did not generate either commotion or real emotion.

#### Pierre Messmer: The Arms Industries Are Not in Decline

The style and arguments of Pierre Messmer were naturally different. "The assembly and the commission have nothing to gain but a lot to lose by

interfering in the armaments problem," the former French prime minister said, adding: "In Europe as in the rest of the world armament industries have few reasons to complain for the time being for their production schedules are sufficiently full. Their jobs are secure whereas many industrial sectors are witnessing unemployment. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation exists. One cannot say that it is in decline." In other words "this industry does not face any urgent problem." In short, for Pierre Messmer the need for cooperation among the Nine to preserve the competitive nature of their industry and avoid being ousted from markets by American competition does not arise.

Pierre Messmer explained that possible initiatives of the community considering the specific characteristics of the armaments industry (strict planning, programs defined by the general staffs) would be doomed to failure: "The commission and the assembly are exposed to the rebuffs of those who will be firm enough--I hope that there will be some of them--to refuse to discuss their national defense with interlocutors who are not entitled to take part." Additionally, to engage along this path is useless "because there are organizations (NATO, Western European Union) in which nearly all our countries are represented and which are competent to handle the arms programs."

The draft resolution presented by the Gaullists was clever. It did not ask the assembly to pronounce itself on the possibility of cooperation in the field of arms production but rather invited it more subtly to confirm that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over defense policy.

There was nothing unexpected in the speeches favoring the rapid undertaking of cooperation in the field of armaments. Those speakers who shared this feeling, they reiterated, thought in terms of the industry and employment. "Since it is indispensable to have a defense apparatus available it is necessary that it be efficient and as inexpensive as possible. Cooperation is enormously important," Mr Berkhouwer (Liberal group, The Netherlands) observed. The same feeling was expressed by Pierre Pflimlin (Christian-Democrat, France), who found that that was "a fundamental problem." According to him it was legitimate "with due respect for the sovereignty of governments" that the Community should be concerned with industrial policy, which also implies--given the complementary nature of the civilian and military branches in many sectors of the economy--the production of military equipment.

Mr Glinne [Glinn] (Socialist, Belgium) noted that "The commission should not be concerned with defense problems. To be sure," he explained, "it would not be good for the new Parliament to impede, right from the start, its right to raise important problems," but in the midst of economic recession to give priority to such an issue rather than to discuss the problems of the steel, glass, textiles, or shipyard industries is a mistake, he said.



Mr Glinne also stressed "the profound distrust of the Socialist group vis-a-vis any attempt which, in the name of jobs to be guaranteed or promoted, may lead to the establishment or consolidation in the community of military-industrial complexes."

For Mr Galluzzi (communist, Italy) to state and restate that only more efficient production is involved no longer has much sense. "The political significance assumed by this debate," he noted, "is very far from the industrial problem. Indeed, it raises the problem of Europe's defense." Mr Galluzzi noted that the question was placed on the Parliament's agenda while the European right is becoming distrustful with regard to the protection of the United States atomic "umbrella." He said that he did not believe in the virtues of a European defense policy but felt that it was necessary "not to limit oneself to a rigid national framework and to make a community effort to leave behind the policy of blocs."

#### British Attacks Against Agricultural Policy

The members of the European Parliament also broached on Wednesday a more down-to-earth problem--that of butter surpluses and subsidized exports to the Soviet Union. The commission was challenged by the British Conservatives and Laborites. Mr Balfour (Conservative Party) placed the problem on a political level. "The community should not make gifts to countries which do not deserve them." The British voters do not understand, he continued, that butter should be sold to the Russians at one-third of the price which they have to pay for it.

Mrs Barbara Castle (Labor Party) took exception to this ideological approach. "The scandal resides in the existence of these surpluses," she said. "We want the entire system (that is, the mechanisms of joint agricultural policy) to be modified." The two British parties were however in agreement about the appropriate conclusion: "We want the consultation procedures of the Parliament, promised by the commission, concerning the sales of butter to third countries to be respected"--in other words, that these sales not be authorized without the "green light" of the assembly.

Finn Olav Gundelach, vice president of the European Commission, in charge of agricultural policy, explained in essence to the British that they were picking the wrong target. If there are surpluses it is necessary to absorb them, he noted. To do so the community should subsidize sales at reduced prices in the interest of the consumers of the Nine and should also subsidize exports to third countries (this second operation costing significantly less than the first). To introduce political discrimination among outside clients is impossible. In short, "we are obliged to export." But, Mr Gundelach added, that is not the real problem and our effort should not focus on this point. What is serious is the chronic existence of sizable surpluses of dairy products.



"Your manner of solving the problem worries me," Michel Debatisse (Christian-democrat, France) told Mr Gundelach by way of an answer. The former president of the FNSEA [National Federation of Unions of Farm Operators (France)] found that the latter was treating the farmers of the community very casually.

Mrs Leroux (Communist Party, France) was "astonished at this lack of reaction of the French Government before this new offensive against our dairy production potential."

Mrs Cresson (Socialist Party, France) first noted that the criticisms leveled at butter exports to the USSR were politically and economically unfounded. "Should we as the community be absent from some major markets? Should we allow the United States to sell its wheat while we preclude ourselves from doing the same thing when it comes to our butter?" Mrs Cresson expanded the discussion and, answering Mr Gundelach indirectly, mentioned the basis of the problem, stressing the importance that the French socialists assigned to possible reforms of agricultural policy. "What is involved," she said, "is to have joint agricultural policy, placed in an impasse by the liberal orientation underlying growing regional disparities and the considerable difficulties of small and middle-sized farmers, oriented so as to satisfy the goals set by the Treaty of Rome." What was the method to be followed? "There is no other alternative but to put a ceiling on assistance by operation and by taking into account regional incomes and regional disparities."

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## ARMAMENTS DEBATE OCCUPIES EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Paris LE FIGARO in French 26 Sep 79 pp 1, 6

[Article by Max Jalade: "The Debate on Armaments at the European Parliament: Supranationality, Hidden Stake"]

[Text] Strasbourg--The European Parliament started yesterday [25 September 1979] late in the afternoon the highly anticipated discussion on "Community programs of arms supplies within the framework of industrial policy," a discussion which the Gaullists, communists, and Socialists had unsuccessfully tried to have removed from the agenda on the previous day.

At the outset there was a question by E.A.J. Fergusson, a member of the British Conservative Party, and Kai-Ilwe von Hassel, a German Christian Democrat, suggesting to the European Commission that it concern itself with the execution of these programs and, for that purpose, that it consult the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. "Such a step falls neither under the jurisdiction of the European Assembly nor that of the European Commission," Michel Debre stated. He feared that a slip could cause the European Parliament to exceed its authority.

In the name of the European Commission Etienne Davignon asserted yesterday that there was no question of losing sight of the spirit of the treaty [Treaty of Rome] and that it was natural that all the problems associated with coherent industrial policy should be a matter of concern.

This was the crux of the discussion, whose hidden stake is supranationality in the last analysis.

This debate was marked by speeches by the representative of the European Commission, Etienne Davignon, Pierre Messmer, Geroges Marchais, and Pierre Pflimlin on the French side, and by an exchange of sharp comments between Michel Debre and Xavier Ortoli, other members of the European Commission, in the corridors.

The discussion will continue this morning [26 September 1979] with a vote on the resolutions introduced by Pierre Messmer, the communists, and the Socialists challenging the jurisdiction of the commission in the field.

## After Butter, Guns

Until the end there was a question whether the debate on industrial policy in the field of armaments was not going to be postponed. All day long the only topic had been the amounts of offset agricultural payments and butter exports. The representatives kept moving continuously from one office to another so as to be present at a working session or at a group deliberation and even to try to put in an appearance on the chamber's floor. It was 1900 hours when the decision was made to consult the group chairmen seeing the late hour and weariness of the translators in order to determine whether it was appropriate or not to start the discussion given that an Italian-Tunisian fishing agreement still had to be dealt with.

Finally, the discussion got underway. Mr Fergusson, one of the authors of the controversial issue, assured his audience that he did not have the slightest reservation that could justify the manifested fears. He expressed surprise at the "storm of publicity" unleashed by his initiative. His goal was very simply to determine what had become of the Klepsch report prepared on the harmonization of industrial policies in the preceding Parliament. What Mr Fergusson sought was that it be understood that what is involved is not to stimulate the arms race but rather to avoid a duplication of orders.

In the name of the European Commission the commissioner having jurisdiction, Mr Davignon, asserted that there was no question losing sight of the spirit of the treaty. There was to be no ambiguity whatever nor misunderstanding on the role of the European Commission, he said. One of its tasks is to be the guardian of the treaty. It would be incomprehensible that it should stray from what it is allowed to do under the treaty. It was clear, he continued, that the problems of defense stem from the sovereignty of states.

This being true not only for Mr Davignon, it was natural to ask what the public orders in the industry represented and he found it normal that such consideration should take place.

After the very prudent comments of Mr Glinn, Belgian chairman of the Socialist group, Georges Marchais came on very strong at the start. He said that he had just witnessed the first attempt to expand the powers of the European Parliament. "We shall never approve the undermining of France's sovereignty, that this parliament should arrogate upon itself the powers devolving on our national parliament exclusively," he exclaimed.

Pierre Messmer in turn spoke and asked that the parliament approve a resolution aimed at the governments and challenging the jurisdiction of the European Commission. Communists and socialists filed an analogous resolution.

As for Pierre Pflimlin, mayor of Strasbourg and fellow-candidate of Simone Veil, he said that he did not understand those who claimed that everything was for the best in the armaments industry and that there should be something unusual in wishing to discuss the topic in that forum. Elected by a border population, he considered that for the latter security reasons had priority over all others. He thus claimed to speak for Europeans who expect their governments to provide them with security.

Among the French delegations the talk centered especially around the discussion of the previous day, about the way in which all the French factions attending--or nearly so--faced those of the other countries. This objective unity was seen again at the time of the discussions on agricultural topics.

Among the Gaullists there was rejoicing at the 87 votes supporting the proposal of Michel Debre to remove from the agenda a discussion which was not held to fall under the purview of the European Parliament and to show that everything was taking place in the new parliament as had been anticipated. Naturally, the vote of Edgar Faure and Andre Rossi, who had come out against the debate on armaments and who are members of the liberal group and fellow-candidates of Simone Veil, was also the subject of much comment. Some wished to see in it a desire of the radicals to assert their identity within the framework of a regrouping of the scattered radical families on the national level.

After debating, at the request of Christian de La Malene, the elimination of offset payments, the Parliament undertook with determination an extensive discussion on the export of French butter (45,000 tons) at reduced prices to the Soviet Union. European farmers were not lacking in defenders--there were 24 registered speakers. The drama is that their interests are not necessarily the same.

Mr Balfour, a member of the British Conservative Party, noted in essence the indignation of his voters who "pay a lot for their butter while gifts are being bestowed with their money on a country whose bombs are targeted at us."

#### "The Cold War"

These comments brought a cry of outrage from Mrs Barbara Castle, a member of the British Labor Party, who accused her colleague of exploiting the agricultural problem "in order to kindle the cold war once again." What concerned Mrs Castle was not so much that commodities were sold to the USSR as the use made of the taxes paid by British housewives.

This intra-British clash was followed by a battle among the ladies. Marie-Madeleine Dienesch, French Christian democrat, noted that there would be less surplus to sell if production were regulated and if the British market had not been supplied, at the expense of European butter, with 120,000 tons of New Zealand butter. This was a major part of the problem, she said. In the name of the French Socialist Party, Edith Cresson defended a similar point of view.

How was the question to be solved? Everyone, beginning with the commission, was highly embarrassed.

After juggling pats of butter in this way as well as tons of whole milk or powdered milk, the time came when it was necessary to postpone the discussion on industrial policy and the armament programs.

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CSO: 3100



## OBSTACLES TO WEAPONS STANDARDIZATION

Paris LE FIGARO in French 26 Sep 79 p 6

[Article "Obstacles to 'Standardization'"]

[Text] In opening the discussion on the armaments industries the European Parliament reechoed the concerns of the Assembly of the Western European Union [WEU], in May 1979, had heard a report by Mr van Waterschoot on this subject presented in the name of the General Affairs Committee.

This report found that the production of modern armaments is necessary for the maintenance of Europe's economic, military, and political independence-- notably, in the face of the considerable increase in the forces of the Warsaw Pact. But he added right away that this production of armaments represented increasingly larger expenses for the states. Hence this question among others: Would it not be possible through European cooperation to insure the greatest degree of security at least cost?

Such cooperation exists, but the rapport of the Western European Union deemed it to be insufficient. According to him the delays and setbacks have diverse causes as follows:

1. Countries like France reject too extensive a standardization which would make it dependent on foreign suppliers for some of its weapons. Standardization would indeed entail a division of labor, with one country producing guns almost exclusively while another would turn out ammunition.
2. Those countries which have a strong armaments industry have developed sales of weapons abroad these past few years and have been encouraged in this respect by the increase in the price of oil and raw materials which disrupted their balance of payments accounts.
3. The armaments industries do not all have the same status: Some are nationalized and others are privately owned.
4. The general staff of the armed forces of each country enjoys great autonomy. It has its traditions, work habits, and equipment modernization cycle. It draws funds from a national budget and must secure the credits which it needs from a government or a national parliament.

Upon the listing of these "obstacles" to a rationalization and standardization of armaments the political dimension of the discussion which got under way in the European Parliament is easy to understand. This political dimension is all the greater for France since our country has not been a member of NATO since 1967, which in the realm of defense means that it is independent, including vis-a-vis the United States.

2662

CSO: 3100

## RECENT EVENTS SIGNAL END OF EUROCOMMUNISM

Cologne RHEINISCHER MERKUR in German 26 Oct 79 p 6

[Report by Erich B. Kusch from Rome: "Swansong for Eurocommunists--Moscow Embarrasses Berlinguer"]

[Text] Eurocommunism, which until recently excited the imagination of European leftists and aroused their hopes, now appears to be as good as dead. The requiem has just been intoned in Moscow by Boris Ponomarev, responsible in the Politburo for relations with the European communist parties which are not, or not yet, in power in their country. "Eurocommunism is at an end," Ponomarev told a conference of the ideological cadres of the CPSU; "it is a deviation which fortunately will soon be obsolete."

The leaders of the West European communist parties, he said, have finally realized that so-called "Eurocommunism" can only harm the international communist movement. Ponomarev added generously that the CPSU Central Committee would "help" the communist parties in every way to overcome possible deviations from Marxism, Leninism and "proletarian internationalism." But this means nothing else than to adjust strictly to the policy of the Kremlin.

The occasion for Moscow taking this stand was provided by the visit of PCI head Enrico Berlinguer to his comrades in Portugal and Spain. There Berlinguer was compelled to note that the enthusiasm for Eurocommunism had long since vanished. Apparently there is no common basis any longer. Berlinguer tried to hide his defeat in this matter in a press conference in Madrid and also in Rome. The communist parties, said Berlinguer, whether or not they espouse Eurocommunism, are not strong enough by themselves to find a way out of the crisis besetting Europe.

The PCI head speaks vaguely of joint action by all forces of the European left, but Georges Marchais has come straight out with the statement that cooperation with Mitterrand's Socialists is impossible. The Portuguese and Spanish Communists reacted similarly. The leader of the Portuguese Communist Party, Alvaro Cunhal, opposed to Eurocommunism from the start,

voiced his opposition to Berlinguer during his visit to Lisbon. Cunhal opposes not only NATO but the European Community, and if Stalin still has an out-and-out admirer, it is Cunhal.

Santiago Carrillo, the Communist Party head in Madrid, while being more friendly and more polite, also left no doubt about the differences in the stands of the Italian and Spanish communist parties--for instance, regarding NATO. The Spanish Communist Party rejects membership in NATO outright, whereas the PCI views it as a guarantee of a balance in Europe.

Thus it is no wonder that Enrico Berlinguer, too, now must abandon Eurocommunism, in which he had placed such great hopes. What contributed to this as well was the talk he had with Brezhnev last month--the last of the leaders of the West European parties to have such a talk. And the discussion about the installing of new U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe entails additional dangerous problems for Berlinguer.

In a five-page paper, the head of the PCI has expounded his stand on this question--a basically pro-Soviet stand, even though he tries to hide this. In lieu of installing the intermediate-range missiles, the PCI proposes immediate negotiations with the Soviet Union. It describes the introduction of these weapons in Europe as the beginning of a new armament race that could be fraught with serious consequences. In an initial stand the Italian Social Democrats stated: "The paper seems to have been written by an ostrich putting its head in the sand."

8790

CSO: 3103

## OBJECTIVES, METHODS OF EAST-SOUTH COOPERATION VIEWED

Rome POLITICA ED ECONOMIA in Italian Jul-Aug 79 pp 36-40

[Article by Massimo Micarelli]

[Text] In seeking to draw an overall picture of East-South cooperation, I shall confine myself to the objectives being set, and then go on to examine the pattern and the instruments used, finally taking a stab at quantifying it with some remarks on those primarily involved. Several political considerations will be stated in conclusion, some with reference to the outlook for the new international economic order in the view of the socialist countries. This synthesis will seek to cover some of the salient aspects of the relationships, necessarily skipping over many of the obviously more technical factors or any in-depth analysis of individual countries. All this is acceptable if the overall picture turns out to be understandable, sketchy though it may be.

Two points really must be made clear before we get into this subject: the first has to do with the lack of statistics, and the second with the different approach the socialist countries take toward underdevelopment. The unreliability of data and the conflicting estimates will be considered on the basis of their value as clues to trends and orders of magnitude. The socialist countries' approach to underdevelopment rejects the concept of "aid," accepting only the term "cooperation," in both the political and substantive senses. Politically, they hold that the industrial powers are the first cause of and solely responsible for underdevelopment, and they feel no obligation to commit themselves to work toward the objectives set by the international agencies concerned with aid to development. From the substantive point of view, most of the resources flowing from the East to the South have gone and will continue to go through economic cooperation channels, particularly those for trade and for export credit grants. It will



be well, furthermore, to bear in mind two other features of cooperation in connection with the socialist countries: one is the absolute primacy of the positions of Cuba and Vietnam, both as members of COMECON and as the leading recipients of resources (together they account for about a third of all such funds); and the other is the "different" role of China.

During the Fifties and Sixties, the COMECON countries under the guidance of the Soviet Union relied on expanding trade for aid in the ambitious task of laying the groundwork for an alternative market to the close commercial ties of the industrial powers, which hampered the development of the Third World. The confrontation between the two blocs, along with the stepped-up economic competition of the Khrushchev period, formed the basis for the cherished illusion that cooperation and trade would be the bonding agent for the natural alliance between the socialist countries and the Third World, thus overturning the world balance of power.

Along about the middle of the Sixties, that philosophy was rescaled to a less aggressive and considerably less ambitious dimension. During the Seventies, with the dreams of swift reversals gone glimmering, the emphasis shifted to concentration of efforts on a limited number of countries with the aim of consolidating the productive structures there and thence deriving reciprocal economic advantages. They were not necessarily looking for new political allies, but since political interests did exist, quite frequently the chosen partners offered most conspicuously sound possibilities of prospective independent development, or demonstrated a determination to push ahead with their own liberation from neocolonial dependency and to achieve full sovereignty over their own mineral resources. Hence the tremendous development in trade, and the profound structural modifications now under way by contrast with the patterns initially adopted as an institutional reference.

#### From Compensation Agreements to Multilateral Accords

The close ties between economic and commercial cooperation, over and above any autonomous flow of two-way trade, have gradually emerged in the context of completion of development "projects," through the delivery of complete factories or machinery used in an industrial complex, or through the building of infrastructures. The institutional matrix making possible a steady flow of goods in both directions between socialist supplier countries and Third World countries was provided by bilateral agreements until the end of the Sixties. Then, in the Seventies, there was increasing impact from multilateral agreements between COMECON and individual beneficiaries, in parallel with a still fast-growing process of further expansion and diversification in the forms of cooperation.

It is clear that initially, in fact, the basic patterns were a reproduction of the bilateral trade arrangements typically used inside COMECON and hence, since the agreements were based on "compensation," they called for equivalence of value in two-way trade, although gradually this rule became less rigid, and came to be applied in a more flexible way. The rigidity of this pattern has gradually softened, primarily thanks to the introduction of new forms of payment toward the end of the Sixties. The greater flexibility derives both from gradual introduction into the agreements of better conditions for repayment of debts in convertible currencies and from greater elasticity in the term of credit (so-called technical credits).

The introduction of greater flexibility in the payments structure hastened its natural growth by opening the way, in some cases, to multilateral transformation, on account of which, in the 1965-1975 decade, the frequency of bilateral compensation agreements dropped from 77 to 57 percent, while their number is now well below that of multilateral agreements (100 as against 450). Accords of this latter kind demonstrably possess a potential for growth in the value of trade far greater than the former, particularly when they call for payment in convertible currencies. It is therefore fairly natural that this trend should have sought to upgrade the structure of cooperation to keep pace with the times, while still assigning a major role to bilateral compensation agreements.

The growth and consolidation of trade with several Third World countries called for new instruments with which to deal with their growing demands. The nervousness induced by the gradual introduction of forms of payment for loans in convertible currencies was very marked, in the light of the chronic weakness of the currencies of many countries, but available data indicate that the levels of trade did not suffer thereby and the risk that this innovation involves seems to be acceptable, especially when there are thoroughly tested long-term agreements which guarantee greater opportunities for diversifying the products traded. The most persuasive examples in this connection are those of Angola, Syria, Sri Lanka, and Brazil, whose trade relations with COMECON were completely covered by compensation agreements in 1970, whereas by 1975 only 50 to 60 percent were so covered.

It is true, nevertheless, that compensation agreements entail less exposure to heavy indebtedness for the Third World countries, but today in many instances this means slowing their trade development, whereas deals which call for forms of convertibility in payments are showing a deficit of 30 percent. This latter figure does not look too dangerous if we consider the sharp rise of this type of settlement in trade, an eight-fold increase over the 1965-1975 decade. If, on the other hand,

we consider the bottom line of the balance of trade between the two sets of countries, we see that between 1970 and 1975 the Third World deficit stabilized at around \$1 billion, while the volume of trade grew at rates higher than the world average and higher than that of internal COMECON trade (the annual mean for 1971-1977 is greater than 25 percent). If we look at this from the angle of the individual COMECON countries, we can get an interesting political footnote from the fact that the growing trend to convertibility settlements is symptomatic of greater openness to international trade. This is particularly true of Poland and Hungary.

In 1975, these two countries had only a quarter of their trade with the Third World under compensation arrangements, while the USSR, which consistently maintains around a 60-percent quota of total trade, is still to a large degree (60 percent) sticking with the more traditional form of the agreement system. Of recent years, the slight decline in the Third World countries' deficit vis-a-vis COMECON is due to increased COMECON purchases from the Third World in raw materials (grain, meat, rubber, and oil), but the hope for curing this state of affairs is tied primarily to the good growth demonstrated by manufactured exports from the Third World, which find a reception on socialist country markets which they could never hope for on western markets. Quite recently there has been a steady and diversified flow of such products: electrical appliances, instruments, metallurgical, chemical, and pharmaceutical products, textiles, and shoes.

The most significant new factor in the COMECON structure designed to expand this kind of trade is its gradual approach to a system of multilateral payments with transferable rubles, albeit with features very different from operations of this sort engaged in by western countries. Since 1973, COMECON's international investment bank (IBB) has had a fund of a million transferable rubles, some of them convertible. Its purpose is long-term financing for industrial projects to be completed under technical assistance accords, in which several COMECON countries are involved, in countries with chronic deficits and hence in need of a long time for repayment and of price stability. A second innovation consists in the possibility of working out a kind of multilateral compensation through the international bank for economic cooperation (IBEC), when a Third World country has a surplus in its accounts with a COMECON member and a deficit in its books with another. The record in this area is not encouraging, mainly owing to the lack of information and awareness of this procedure of which Third World countries have complained. It is important to emphasize the point that these new tools are designed to increase the flexibility of the overall cooperation system, fitting in beside and complementing the normal and tried-and-true forms of cooperation.

## **Tripartite Industrial Special and Cooperation Agreements**

To complete the picture, we must perforce include two relatively recent and promising systems: three-party special and cooperative agreements on industry, known for short as "East-West-South" accords. Special agreements are multilateral in nature, and have recently emerged in connection with the few countries with whom bilateral accords are already in existence. If we exclude the special case of this kind in agreements made with Yugoslavia, which date back to 1964, as well as the one with Finland, the most significant experiments with this sort of arrangements are those involving Iraq and Mexico, particularly in singling out the diversities in their objectives. The 1975 agreement with Iraq was designed to intensify its already close trade relations and hence cooperation within that framework. A good quarter of Iraq's trade is with the COMECON countries, and cooperation has been aimed primarily at increasing national sovereignty over raw materials and their industrial processing. In the case of Mexico, the goal is diversification in economic cooperation, which previously had only tenuous ties with COMECON. The joint commission for this agreement has been in operation since 1976, and concerns itself mostly with the fisheries, although it has its eye on manufacturing and vegetable oil production as well.

Three-party cooperation, on the contrary, is part of the ongoing process of internationalizing investment capital through joint delivery of industrial plants on a keys-in-hand or product-in-hand basis by one or more western and socialist countries in response to appeals for bids by Third World countries. What these amount to, in substance, is exports of investment goods as part of industrial plants to be built in the Third World, or in the form of infrastructures, usually handled by a prime contractor from the COMECON countries or from import-export agencies from the same area. Triangulation of this sort has already taken on formal shape in a good number of model agreements, most of them signed since 1972 by import-export agencies in the COMECON area and western businesses or industry, without there being any explicit mention in the contracts of the countries where the cooperation is to take place, nor of the specific projects to be undertaken.

## **Arab World Trade and Latin American Penetration**

It will suffice here to refer briefly to the concentration of projects completed mainly in the Maghreb-Middle East area, primarily as a consequence of the increase in oil revenues, the very dynamic role Poland and Hungary have played to increase ties with western industry, and the minor role of the USSR in this sector, although it is involved in construction of very large industrial plants clearly specializing in the areas of



heavy industry, electrical power, and transport. One new aspect in this field is the socialist countries' move into Latin America with major infrastructure projects, whose very high cost has required backing from international financial sources. Equally new are cases of export financing or for projects undertaken in several Third World countries through the use of development loans granted, for example, by Iran to Afghanistan for goods from the COMECON.

TABLE I. NET EXPENDITURES BY THE PLANNED ECONOMY COUNTRIES IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS (including aid to Cambodia, Cuba, Korea, and Vietnam)

OECD development cooperation	Average 1970-72	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977 <sup>a</sup>
millions of dollars						
Aid under liberal conditions						
USSR	555	650	600	325	300	260
China	215	410	340	330	345	265
Eastern Europe	120	205	175	225	180	180
TOTAL	890	1,265	1,115	880	825	705
Total net input						
USSR	620	720	670	375	345	260
China	215	410	340	330	345	265
Eastern Europe	165	235	195	265	210	205
TOTAL	1,000	1,365	1,205	970	900	730

Source: OECD "Cooperation for Development," Paris, 1978

I shall confine myself to consideration of the Seventies, referring to estimates provided by the OECD. For the USSR only I shall cite some other estimates for the 1959-1969 period. (For an assessment of trends in commercial exchanges, see the article by M. Miele in POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE, September 1978, page 44.)

The distinction between aid under liberal conditions and net inputs is, in this case, not very meaningful, since practically speaking these are long-term loans which account for almost all aid. The overall conditions for these loans, except for specific agreements and variations of record, spread over 8 to 12 years, but it is not infrequent to find agreements covering a longer term, with an interest rate at around 2 to 3 percent, or as much as 5 percent for medium-term (3-5 years) commercial loans. In some agreements, there is a moratorium on payments



for at least 2 years, and stipulations as to an option to pay in products, often those of the completed industrial project, etc. Despite all this, the trend toward a decline in resources channeled toward the Third World is a steady one, particularly marked for the USSR, at least since the oil crisis. It is certain that the domestic troubles besetting the Soviet economy would repay an assessment in greater depth of their impact on cooperation policy. Be that as it may, several shorter-term considerations would explain the decline as due to the slowdown in aid to Cuba and Vietnam, by comparison with its heavy predominance during the Sixties.

Early in the Seventies, however, China's role increased, but subsequently the truly exorbitant cost of financing for a country whose level of development is certainly not to be compared with that of the Soviet Union turned out to be intolerable, although Chinese aid did hold at the same level of magnitude as the flow of financing from the Soviet Union. In general, it must be admitted that the combined total of such aid is such that its overall impact on the Third World looks decidedly limited, and so there would seem to be no point in making a comparison on this ground with the western countries, partly, of course, because different cooperation policies require different approaches and different instrumentalities.

Consideration of the impact of the socialist country contribution, however, rises because of the intense geographical concentration which has been its traditional pattern. In the case of the USSR, the concentration of beneficiaries was such that right up until the Seventies, ten countries were receiving 30 percent of all resources earmarked for cooperation, with an annual net flow of something like \$400 million. The socialist countries in the Third World (Cuba, Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, and Mongolia) got about 60 percent of this pie, while the other recipients have traditionally been concentrated in the Arab area (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, to name the biggest ones), and India. The Arab world at the same time soaked up 50 percent of the cooperation input from the East European countries, and 75 percent of the total went for major development projects.

As for commercial credits, it should be noted that the eastern countries have shorter terms for repayment and in general their relative conditions are less flexible. Withstanding some isolated and sizable examples, one negative factor can be found in the low level of grants in the total (5 percent), and of the grant-factor, meaning the portion not actually paid back for financing (30 to 40 percent). In recent years there has been an increase in the technical aid component for programs of that kind started in 1974 and designed to provide technical

and university training for many thousands of students coming from the Third World. The Chinese have concentrated their efforts in Africa, as if to offset the absence of any Soviet efforts there, particularly in the poorest countries and with absolutely liberal conditions: no interest, reimbursement in local currency spent on local purchases, very long terms, etc. Recent data confirm, however, a decline in China's contributions as well.

### Advantages and Rigidity of the Planned Economy

COMECON has always striven to make much of the features and advantages of its planned organization of trade and development. It has done so most emphatically in its dealings with the Third World, thereby guaranteeing a degree of stability in the flow of trade and in prices, on the one hand, while on the other allowing for very long-term structural adjustments in economic relations and in the financial balance. The goal of fostering a new international division of labor, both among the COMECON nations and in their cooperation relations, has turned out to be thus far too ambitious with respect to the needs of the Third World, particularly at a time of increasing awareness of the grave trend of a declining flow of resources set aside for the purpose. Each year, in fact, no more than two or three very large cooperation initiatives soak up most of these resources, and only recently does there seem to be some indication of second thoughts as to the effectiveness of huge development projects.

Certain key countries, like Egypt and India, have been leading actors in pilot experiments at great development projects, but during the Seventies the "gigantism" of plants and installations supplied seems to be waning somewhat, even though it is the only available technological and productive model compatible with COMECON's structure. It would be wise to assess the economic effectiveness of these experiments on a case-by-case basis. There are, however, various contradictions which certainly for the countries cited, but generally as well, have not brought about any political results, if such were indeed the purpose behind prestigious economic undertakings. The Soviets themselves seem to be awakening to this fact, hence the flexibility we referred to earlier, which they are trying to fit into the system, seeking in part to get rid of the rigidity of economic cooperation, which is increasingly emerging as the real weak point in relations with the Third World.

Good results in trade somehow fail to translate into an original design for development suitable for proposal. The fact is that support of Third World views as to the new international economic order is contradicted by the cooperation policy pursued.

During the Sixties, for example, COMECON went along with or encouraged, through cooperation, a development model that would replace imports from western countries, whereas during the Seventies it seems to prefer development of its trading partners tied to an expansion of exports, including manufactured goods.

This latter tendency goes along with lowered COMECON financial commitment to economic cooperation, motivated, as we said, by growing domestic economic difficulties and the growing need for raw materials, particularly in the countries of Eastern Europe. While continuing to reject the logical category of resource "transfers," many debt reduction agreements seek a very specific political role in certain key countries in the Arab world, or in the quest for good neighborly relations with such nations as Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. The international political situation is such right now as to counsel strongly in favor of choosing more partners within the scope of the new world economic order, but COMECON somehow seems unable to coordinate political and economic action in such an approach and over a longer period of time. Probably the Soviet Union's strategy as a great world power requires, at the political level, another period of detente, which would give it time to reorganize itself, politically, of course, but primarily at the economic level.

6182

CS0: 3104

## ARMY STAGES LARGE-SCALE MANEUVERS

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 23 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] Maneuvers to test the so-called area defense concept will take place from 16 to 23 November. A total of 27,500 members of the First Army Corps are deployed in an area 30 km wide, south of the Danube, between Melk, Amstetten, Waidhofen and Scheibbs. These are the largest maneuvers the Austrian army has ever staged in its 25-year existence. The conversion of the army to a militia with only 10 percent of professional soldiers is going according to plan and will be concluded in 1985.

There is nothing spectacular about either the size of the troop units deployed, nor about the duration of the maneuvers, nor about the terrain chosen for them, according to Commander Spannocchi. The valley of the Danube has always been and still is a passage terrain. The commander also pointed out that units of a similar size staged maneuvers in Switzerland every second year. But Austria is beginning to catch up with the other neutral states. Military expenditures have grown more substantially since 1970 than is apparent in the defense budget. Major expenditures are for the building of barracks.

The concept of area defense is extensively recognized by the populace today, according to Spannocchi. The basic idea is to achieve a maximum of deterrence effect with the ways and means at disposal, and to make it as costly as possible for an aggressor to enter and remain in the area. Area defense consists essentially of two elements: the defense of especially important areas, so-called key zones, and the securing of the remaining national area. It is not attempted to meet a superior enemy with equal strength. Mobile infantry attacks the aggressor in the flank and back, and attacks the enemy supply units. The comparison with partisan or guerilla warfare, which has often been made after the new defense concept became known, is, however, not quite accurate, according to Spannocchi. He uses the expression "chase combat."

The amazing publicity given to the maneuvers is due to the fact that they had to be announced, according to the final Helsinki accords. All 34 member nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were invited to send observers. Even more important is the information for Austrians themselves; it contributes decisively to a greater

acceptance of the Austrian Army. Nothing is being omitted in order to demonstrate function and necessity of an army, even if it is limited by a federal treaty and, for example, may not have any rockets at its disposal. That the propaganda is effective can be seen from the fact, among other things, that an increasing number of young men volunteer for a full year of service instead of the obligatory 8 months.

9328

CSO: 3103



## PRL, MOC, FDF SCHEDULE ELECTIONS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 14-15 Oct 79 pp 1, 2

[Article by S. de W.: "Election for the Head of the PRL and MOC; PS Congress, FDF General Council Meeting: Political Scene is Hot"]

[Text] This weekend and its spillover into the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] general council meeting on Monday constitutes a "hot" period in Belgian political life. The definitive reunification of Walloon and Brussels liberals, a socialist party congress of "clarification," the FDF general council meeting, a mini-reshuffle of the cabinet on Monday, the designation of a new head of the Christian Workers Movement [MOC]--the political columnists will have plenty to do. And a special CVP [expansion unknown] congress from now until the end of the year on governmental reform--that on financial problems--is speaking out against the system of endowments and is preaching the proper financial responsibility of each region and each community. This is yet more fallout from the KIL [expansion unknown] report concluding that Flanders is supporting Wallonia.

Accordingly, this Sunday the socialist party congress intends to take stock within itself of its dominant factions. There are presently three of them: the official line implying approval of the socialist ministers and their maintenance in the government, that of Edmond Leburton who, without officially presenting a distinctive, modulated alternative at the congress, threatens to be a burden in the long run, notably on account of the community plan which he has openly taken with respect to the party's present management. Finally, there is the Socialist Tribune faction, led by Glinne and Yerna and put in concrete form by a motion presented to the members of the congress, which criticizes the party's management (which is to its left) and feels that in this government the socialists are the hostages of rightist currents which pass unacceptable measures of social regress.

In the editorial which he had appear in the Saturday morning LE PEUPLE, the president of the socialist party, Andre Cools recalls the role of the right to factions in the party, the right to organize. "I refuse," he writes "to leave the country to chance; I refuse to let the PS [Socialist Party] cultivate its state of mind passively in a continuous blur. Accordingly, tomorrow at the Congress of Brussels I will ask the party to express itself clearly, to choose a position democratically and to adhere to it in order to avoid the bogging down which threatens to paralyze it in time."

It should be noted that the appearance of this editorial is stirring up diverse eddies within LE PEUPLE itself, on which the liquidator of this press association, Henry Lebeau commented Saturday morning on the front page next to the presidential editorial. As the result of this restatement the advisory commission designated by the cooperators in order to regulate problems of the content of the newspapers during the liquidation decided on the publication of the motions submitted to the congress and, in the Friday papers, of a text of each of the three factions which had broken away at the congress of Tournai. The party bureau, however, asked that in addition to the motions only the articles explaining them be published, an action which practically eliminates Leburton's faction.

The committee nevertheless decided to maintain its initial plan, but on Friday a new rebound occurred: while the bureau had announced a presidential editorial which had nothing to do with the congress, Cools' text was devoted exclusively to it. "I take it upon myself to let the editorial appear in spite of everything, since it is materially impossible for me to obtain the advice of the commission and since on the other hand to have it appear after the congress would no longer make any sense," the liquidator writes.

#### PRL and MOC Elections

It is this Saturday that the members of the party bureau are to be elected by the permanent committee of the Liberal Reform Party [PRL] which is meeting at Namur.

Practically speaking, here it is a question of statutory concretization of the reunification of Walloon and Brussels liberals. This is no surprise for the president and vice-president who have already been elected for a long time: Jean Gol for the Walloons and Pierre Van Halteren for the Bruxellois. The "match" will be played for the choice of 3 vice presidents from among 4 candidates and for the designation of 25 bureau members from among 41 candidates.

Within the Christian Worker Movement [CWM] this Saturday will also be an election day. Two candidates are confronting each other: Janine Wynant and Francois Martou. At last, as can be read elsewhere, a compromise formula in the form of a troika (with Hallet) has been found. It remains for the movement to approve it.

Will Francois Martou's resolutions recently presented to the Free Walonia group (dual federalism implying the institutional disappearance of Brussels) be invoked Monday night during the FDF general council meeting? That would seem to be very possible, although the president of the party, Antoinette Spaak specified that Martou had been speaking on his own behalf. This general council meeting, held behind closed doors, is to take stock of the party's strategy with respect to the government. Will the Brussels party maintain its participation? How far will it go? Will it, on the other hand, seek a point of departure which will place it on the same wave length as the Walloon Assembly? There are so many questions to which the Monday night meeting should provide an answer.

## WALLOON, BRUSSELS LIBERALS JOIN PRL

Brussels LE SOIR in French 16 Oct 79 p 2

[Article: "Walloon and Brussels Liberals Officially Reunited in PRL"]

[Text] In April 1979 a choice was made: tripartite government, the traditional choice in difficult moments was rejected and the most implacable combatants of the community struggle were selected to form a government. Volksunie was sown along the way, but the present government, which in fact is a CVP [Flemish Social Christian Party]-PS [Socialist Party]-FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] government, is continuing the same action." This is how Jean Gol explained the current political situation in his speech at the close of the PRL [Liberal Reform Party] permanent committee, which met Saturday.

"Whatever the choice of the socialist party and the FDF might be, the government of tomorrow will be a patched-up government in which Mr Califice will perhaps occupy the post of deputy prime minister, a result which will make the Martens-Califice-Spitaels government the government furthest to the left in the community, in which Mr Spitaels will give the appearance of being a moderate," Gol added. He felt that the balance sheet of this government added up to zero in all fields, particularly in community matters where they are still under the rule of Perrin-Vandekerckhove. And the president of the PRL recalls the PRL proposals to mind: the creation of two parliaments, one French-speaking, the other Flemish, and of a Brussels regional council. "Not to reform this country is the best way of making it break into pieces. But this reform does not imply that there is no longer any national solidarity. A federal government in fact could not exist without this solidarity," Gol added.

## To Participate Or Not in a Government

After having criticized several aspects of government policy and having made certain suggestions, notably in matters of social security reform, Gol felt that it is the confusion reigning within the government which obliges him to ask for an unprecedented vote on a communication to parliament and to increase government radio and television communications. Gol felt that the

fact that he was being asked to each press conference that he held under what conditions the liberals would support the government was significant of the latter's poor condition. He recalled to mind once again that the liberals would not serve as a spare tire but that they feel that elections would be damaging for the country and for democracy. Consequently, if asked, they will agree to participate in negotiations with a view to forming a new government. "We are not the ones doing the asking in this matter, so we will not change our views again on this question," Gol concluded.

#### New Permanent Committee

The new permanent committee had been assembled on Saturday since the morning in order to elect the members of the party's permanent committee.

In addition to Gol, the president and Van Halteren, the first vice president, this committee is composed in the following manner: vice presidents: Jean Bock, Charles Poewick and Jacques Wathélet; political secretary general: Andre Bertouille; joint political secretary: Armand De Decker; members (25, 10 from Brussels): Brassinne, Bruvr, Colart, Cornet, Debouverie, Delruelle, Ducarne, Duquesne, Goblet d'Aviella, Godinache-Lambert, Hasquin, Hazette, Paul Henrion, Hougardy, Houtmans, Janssens, Klein, Monfils, Jocelyne Olivier, Maurice Olivier, Plas, Eric Poewick, Van Dosselaere, Zimmer and Zurstrassen.

"The merger of the FRLW [Party of Liberty and Walloon Reform] and the FRL [Liberal Reform Party] is now complete," noted the president, who specified that the FRL is composed of six districts, four Walloon districts, a Brussels district and a district for Nivelles.

The plenary session of the afternoon had started with a tribute to President Pierre Descamps, who this week announced to the president of the Senate his resignation from his post as provincial senator as he had announced before the recess in order to permit Luc Beyer to be seated in the Senate.

9380

CSO: 3100

## SOCIOLOGISTS SEE 'NEW MIDDLE CLASS' VOTER DECIDING ELECTIONS

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 18 Oct 79 p 10

[Text] The role for the political center and for the new, mobile middle class, i.e. the well-paid white-collar workers and civil servants, has had an impact on the political parties themselves. Following the adoption of the Godesberg Program in 1959 and even more so under the chairmanship of Willy Brandt, the SPD has changed from a labor party to a white-collar and civil servants' party. As of 1977, only every fourth member of the SPD was a working man, whereas 25 percent of the members were white-collar workers and 14 percent were civil servants. On the other hand, the self-employed, the professionals and the farmers make up a mere 5 percent of the SPD membership. But even in the present-day CDU, led by Helmut Kohl, their share of the total membership is just 27 percent which means that they no longer have a decisive role to play. Another 27 percent of all CDU members are white-collar workers and 14 percent are civil servants.

In the Bonn party headquarters there is a great deal of anxiety about the "Greens." Willy Brandt is afraid that the "Greens," who get their main support from young protest voters, may make deep enough inroads into the Socialist-Liberal vote to hand the CDU-CSU an absolute Bundestag majority in 1980, the more so since it needs a lower percentage of the vote than in 1976 (48.6 percent) to attain it this time. But the battle is not so much against the "Greens," but for the "new middle class" - white-collar workers and civil servants.

It is this mobile middle class which provides most of the multipliers and swing voters who decide elections nowadays. And it is the favor of these voters which the parties are primarily trying to gain with their tax abatement plans. Election sociologists agree that even today two-thirds to



three-quarters of all voters have decided how to vote before they actually go to the polls. The campaign effort therefore revolves around mobilizing this basic core of voters, getting as many of the long-time party faithful to vote as possible and winning the swing vote.

But the fact is that the political parties are unable to rely on the party faithful as much as before. The battlements of their erstwhile strongholds are crumbling almost everywhere; the urban-rural voting patterns have leveled off; traditional ties have loosened. More and more voters are on the move.

The causes for this, according to election researchers and sociologists, are traceable to the development of a "uniform middle-class society," to the decline in the number of blue-collar workers, the growth of the white-collar class, the expansion of the services sector, the erosion of the old middle class of self-employed and farmers, but also to the education explosion, the higher rate of income and the equalization of social differences. Class attitudes characteristic of former times are passed on less and less from one generation to the next. Both father and grandfather may have voted for the SPD; but that does not mean that the son will. As a result, the very significant differences in the CDU-CSU and the SPD voter profile of as little as 20 years ago have largely disappeared.

Just how similar the voter and membership data of both the CDU-CSU and the SPD have become since 1959 was shown in a study by Peter Gluchowski and Hans-Joachim Veen, published in issue No 3 of the Journal for Parliamentary Questions. It indicates that there is hardly a difference between CDU-CSU and SPD voters as to their level of education and as to the proportion of men and women.

The composition by professions, too, is fast beginning to match. In 1959, for example, the blue-collar component accounted for some 60 percent of the total SPD vote. It now stands at about 40 percent, i.e. only 10 percent higher than the blue-collar share of the CDU vote, which has remained relatively constant at about 30 percent over the past 20 years. During the same time frame, the white-collar share of the SPD vote, which had stood at about 8 percent in 1959, had risen by more than 30 percentage points by 1979. This is about equal to the white-collar share of the CDU-CSU vote.

Civil servants, too, are about equally represented among the voters of the two parties. As for retirees, the CDU-CSU is ahead in that category.

The CDU-CSU has held on to its front-running position among the self-employed, the professionals and the farmers. Among these categories the CDU-CSU still has a reliable majority which is on the wane, however, due to the overall decline in self-employed in relation to the total voting population.

Religious affiliation continues to play an important role in determining the vote. As before, the number of Protestants voting for the SPD is significantly larger than that voting for the CDU-CSU. And the Catholic vote for the CDU-CSU is much greater than for the SPD.

The SPD is still quite far ahead among union members. But the number of unionists voting for the CDU-CSU has increased appreciably. In 1965 it stood at 10 percent; by 1978 it had reached 15 percent. By comparison, the SPD's union vote dropped from 33 percent to 25 percent between 1965 and 1971.

The tendencies toward uniformity in the makeup of the two large popular parties have not been as pronounced in the membership area as they have in comparative voting strength. In 1977, the educational level of SPD members taken overall was distinctly lower than that of CDU members. Whereas 29 percent of the CDU members have a secondary school diploma and have graduated from a college or university and another 26 percent have an intermediate diploma for an overall total of 55 percent, the comparable SPD figures are 15 percent (secondary school and college graduates) plus 22 percent (intermediate diploma holders) for a grand total of 37 percent. As compared with these figures, half of the SPD membership had graduated from grade school and had served an apprenticeship.

During the early fifties the self-employed, the professionals and the farmers made up most of the CDU membership and blue-collar workers most of the SPD membership; by the end of the seventies, this distinction had largely disappeared. The SPD has changed from a traditional worker's party to a white-collar and civil servant's party. Only about a quarter of the 1 million plus SPD members are blue-collar workers at this stage (cf. *HANDELSBLATT* 10 March 1978). By comparison, the preponderance of self-employed, professionals and farmers which in 1955 made up 38 percent of the CDU membership has declined. In 1977, they totaled 27 percent, i.e. they were equal to the number of white-collar workers. As for blue-collar workers, they accounted for 23 percent of the SPD membership in 1977 as compared to a mere 9 percent of the CDU membership.

Both of the large popular parties are parties for men. Women make up 20 percent of the CDU membership and 21 percent of the SPD membership.

Even if the SPD no longer qualifies as a worker's party, it is still a party of unionists. In 1977, half of all SPD members belonged to one union or another; the comparable CDU total was only 19 percent.

But even for the representative SPD party faithful class consciousness is pretty much a thing of the past. According to an SPD research study conducted in early 1978, the average SPD member is a male grade school graduate whose gross monthly earnings of DM 2,250.00 are about DM 100.00 higher than the average wage earner's and who aspires to a higher position on the social ladder. Thus the battle aimed at capturing the center and the mobile new middle class which will decide the election has transformed the political parties themselves.

## PARTY COLLEAGUES' DEMANDS UPON STRAUSS ARE MAJOR BURDEN

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Oct 79 p 1

[Editorial by Johann Georg Reissmueller: "How Will it Come Out?"]

[Text] If one traces Franz Josef Strauss' trek which is to lead him to the chancellorship in the fall of 1980 back to its beginnings, one can make out four distinct phases along the way. Right after the last Bundestag elections, the CSU chairman attempted to split the combined CDU-CSU down the middle. Neither Kohl, the joint candidate for the chancellorship, nor the CDU campaign strategy, which he considered too weak and vague, had been to Strauss' liking. The first move he made was to leave the parliamentary caucus and thereby to serve the sister party with an ultimatum: either we steer a different course together which would call for another man at the helm or we split up into two distinct FRG-wide parties which compete with one another during the campaign but may jointly form a government after the election, with Strauss probably thinking of himself as its head.

This gambit misfired. Strauss had underestimated both the numerical strength and the vigor of those within the parties who stood up for unity and against splitting the parties which could bankrupt both. But he did hold to his contention that a Bonn opposition, inspired and led by Kohl, had no chance of winning an absolute majority. But, in sum, he failed in his first try at changing the party configuration in Bonn.

This does not mean that Strauss gave up; he decided to hold some part of the idea in reserve against the day when the process of erosion to which the established parties are subject would bring forth a new party suited for forming a government coalition with the CDU-CSU. Last spring, the tax unionist Fredersdorf founded his Citizens' Party. For a while it looked as if it might fill the bill. But it became apparent soon enough that it would not work out after all.

Realist that he is, Strauss knows from experience that this type of 1-day-wonder party can serve as a detour to power at best. The main access route pointed to a takeover of the CDU-CSU leadership as long as the two parties could not or could not yet be split. To reach this goal, he had to prevent Kohl from running for chancellor again. Kohl made it easy for Strauss to reach his goal, and with a good conscience at that. Kohl, who had gained a great deal of support for the CDU-CSU before the elections in 1976 and at election time, never really got on as opposition leader in Bonn. With every passing month it became clearer to the opposition that Kohl was not the man who could win (against Schmidt) in 1980. Strauss had always thought of himself as the better nominee; but he hesitated a long time before throwing his hat in the ring. Six months ago, when Kohl lost the last vestige of party support for a second candidacy and when he bypassed the CSU in trying to force the party to accept Albrecht as his successor, the time had finally come for Strauss to act. Dissatisfaction with Kohl was transferred to Albrecht and Strauss had reached the goal he had, it seems, meant to reach in earnest only rather late in the game.

The fourth phase, which began after this year's summer vacations and will last until election day 1980, sees Strauss for the first time not fighting inside the CDU-CSU or against one or another of its wings, but out in the open against the government coalition. The skills available to him in this contest are many: his keen intellect; his wide-ranging (and in some cases, profound) expertise; his highly-developed gift for rhetoric and, on top of all this, a high degree of physical stamina. But, there is a good deal working against him, too. Least or all perhaps the long-lasting campaign against him on the part of the entire left over the past decades; it has worn off, even if some of it has rubbed off on this or that voter.

A greater danger for Strauss are the high demands made upon him by his supporters and more recently, in a somewhat grudging manner, by his opponents within the CDU-CSU. After ten oppressive years spent in opposition, the CDU-CSU expects Strauss to work miracles--at a time when Chancellor Schmidt's popularity is at its peak. He may also suffer because some politicians at all levels of the CDU are unwilling to campaign all-out for a candidate they refused or at least did not wholeheartedly accept. And then, as always, Strauss is in a sense his own worst enemy. He does have a tendency to lose his self-control, to exaggerate and to over-react with a vengeance, even within his own ranks.

At this point it is hard to tell what the outcome for Strauss or for the CDU-CSU is likely to be. So far he has not caused a big swing toward the CDU-CSU or against it. Is this perhaps an omen for the Bundestag election? If he wins it--either under his own steam or with the help of the Greens--the CDU-CSU will be more unified than it has been in decades, and not only in the first flush of victory. Everyone will accept him as Number One; they will say they always knew he was Number One and they will all go all out for him. And within the CDU-CSU the memory of the split will be like a bad dream of long ago.

But if Strauss should lose, the majority of CDU-CSU members will blame him and a minority within the parties will blame the majority. The resulting sound and fury are likely to rend the CDU-CSU asunder. It might all happen very quickly because who would make a real effort to hold together what is about to disintegrate by sheer force?

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CSO: 3103



## CDU PAPER ON SPD AND FDP KEYNOTES ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 31 Oct 79 p 2

[Report by "my": "Geissler Sees SPD in Deep Identity Crisis--CDU Presents Study About SPD and FDP Strategy"]

[Text] Bonn, 30 October--The CDU charged on Tuesday [30 October] that the federal government was impotent in all political fields. Submitting a paper written in the Konrad-Adenauer-Haus about "The Strategy and Self-Appraisal of the SPD and the FDP," CDU Secretary General Geissler told correspondents in Bonn that governing had become an end in itself for the two coalition parties. Lines of political conflict, he said, are running "right through this coalition and the coalition parties." The SPD was in a deep identity crisis, while the FDP was indulging in optimism. With its analysis of the SPD-FDP coalition, the CDU anticipates the government parties by a couple of weeks. These plan to celebrate their 10-year coalition "jubilee" in the first half of November by presenting a positive balance sheet.

Geissler said that the future of the SPD and FDP, "which lack new ideas and political vitality," was "a matter of the past." In his opinion, the CDU cannot remain indifferent in the face of such a conclusion, because an opposition which does not want to degenerate to anything more than a party of obstruction must be interested in the kind of government which solves problems. Geissler did not intend his reproaches or the paper as a whole to be regarded as a direct election campaign attack but rather as an overdue description of the state of affairs in the government camp. As it was, the CDU secretary general was noticeably pleased for once to be able to deal with parties other than his own. Geissler remarked: "In the CDU today there are no fights between wings such as there are in the SPD."

The strategy of the SPD and FDP, Geissler went on, can be expressed in the slogan: "We are doing quite well, aren't we?" This is intended to "substitute for the lack of any perspective for the future and to portray the result of 10 years of exclusive administration by the coalition parties as a sound performance." And yet, the SPD's deep identity crisis was being revealed openly even by the party's own leading politicians, such as Eppler and Glotz. In Geissler's judgment, the Social Democrats are trying to

overcome it by a dual strategy: while Helmut Schmidt was representing "the economic aspect," Willy Brandt was supposed to embody the party's basic values and nostalgic memories. Geissler called it a "paradox of SPD party history" that it would present itself to the electorate as a "party of the tested status quo." The FDP, too, was too preoccupied with searching for its identity to be expected to give answers regarding the future.

In the part of the paper dealing with individual issues, the CDU bases itself primarily on common features and contradictions in the coalition parties in the fields of tax policy, ownership policy ("between freedom and collectivism"), economic planning and particularly also energy policy. In social policy as well, the SPD and the FDP were taking different stands. In its more than 50 pages, the paper also deals with policy on education, the law, Europe, development and foreign affairs and security.

Concerning the situation within the SPD, the study points out that the dispute is shifting increasingly from a conflict within the party (former fights between wings) to a confrontation between party and government. The FDP is charged above all with opportunism, the study stating that it was easiest for the Free Democrats to overcome the 5 percent hurdle by showing themselves "simultaneously as governing and as an opposition within the government."

The FDP has reacted with an announcement stating that Geissler's utterances lack a "solid basis" and describing the CDU presentation as yet another "idle attempt" to divert attention from the party's own lack of leadership.

SPD spokesman Schwartz "complimented" the CDU saying that Geissler's special homework showed that the Konrad-Adenauer-Haus has considerable archives. Politically, on the other hand, the CDU with its paper had certified to its inadequacy, offering not a trace of substantive solutions of the problems of today and tomorrow.

8790

CSO: 3103

## GREENS SCORE IN BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG ELECTIONS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 31 Oct 79 p 2

[Report by K. S.: "Green Successes in Baden-Wuerttemberg--Small Voter Turnout, CDU Losses in Communal Elections"]

[Text] Stuttgart, 30 October--In the Baden-Wuerttemberg district assembly elections this past weekend, the SPD, it turns out, managed to register slight gains in votes compared with the last district assembly elections in 1973, whereas the CDU had to put up with slight losses. According to an announcement in Stuttgart on Tuesday [30 October] based on election results for 32 of the 35 rural district assemblies to be newly elected, the CDU received 48.41 percent of the vote (compared with 49.42 percent in 1973), the SPD 29.38 percent (compared with 27.59) and the FDP 4.76 percent (compared with 5.25 percent in 1973). The Free Voters Associations (FWV), traditionally particularly strongly represented in communal elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg, received 3.56 percent (compared with 3.41 percent in 1973). The "Greens" (who, however, ran in only five rural districts) did remarkably well. In Tuebingen they received 11.7 percent of the vote (five seats), in Loerrach 10.8 percent (six district assembly seats), in Calw 3.24 percent (one seat), in the Hohenlohe district 4.01 percent (one seat). At 53 percent, the voter turnout was exceptionally low. This is due, on the one hand, to the complicated election procedure (cumulate and split voting) and, on the other hand, to the fact that the municipal council elections had to be postponed because of a judgment by the Baden-Wuerttemberg Supreme Court which had declared the municipal council election procedures to be unconstitutional in part.

No elections took place in the nine urban districts. In the Baden-Wuerttemberg rural districts, which need to elect the district administrators, there is only one SPD district administrator (Boeblingen) at present, the rest being CDU members or people not affiliated with a party. Following the European elections, in which the Greens in Baden-Wuerttemberg received an average 4.5 percent of the vote, this district assembly election was the second test election for the Greens, who only a few weeks ago combined under the chairmanship of a Tuebingen senior secondary school teacher.

In all, it is assumed that the district assembly elections do not permit any definite conclusions concerning the Baden-Wuerttemberg Landtag elections in March of next year. The SPD voters, with greater interest in regional and local affairs, had more reasons to vote than the great Baden-Wuerttemberg silent majority of CDU voters, who perhaps in any case found the election procedure involving so much paper and so many persons too difficult. Furthermore there are peculiarities from one district to another prohibiting large scale considerations. In Offenburg, for example, where the CDU suffered considerable losses, the SPD chief mayor, Grueber, had been ostracized far too loudly by the only local paper, and also by the CDU, for a real estate purchase which clearly was in line with usual practice; compared with 53.8 percent in 1973, the CDU received only 49.9 percent of the vote, while the SPD, with Chief Mayor Grueber running in the district assembly election, got 28.7 percent compared with 26.4 percent in 1973.

The good result for the Greens in Loerrach probably is due to the fact that a nuclear power plant is being built in Rheinfelden in neighboring Switzerland. But why are there no Greens in the Rural District of Emmendingen, where the Kaiserstuehl locality of Wyhl, so well known because of the controversial nuclear power project, is located? The reason must be FDP Landtag Deputy Schoett from Endingen, a chemist, pharmacist and farmer rolled into one but not an astute politician--rather, despite his Alemannic deliberateness, a staunch opponent of nuclear power plants.

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CSO: 3103

## ECONOMICS MINISTER VIEWS OIL SUPPLY, MARKET

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 18 Oct 79 p 3

[Text] The present supply level of petroleum products just before winter is good. Federal Economics Minister Graf Lambsdorff presented this evaluation to the Federal cabinet on Wednesday, but at the same time he pointed to the continuing uncertainties in the politics of the oil-exporting countries.

Lambsdorff therefore was of the opinion that the present unstable balance between supply and demand, in spite of the clear progress registered by the Bonn economics experts of a "away from oil" policy, should continue to give cause to follow this policy and the rational treatment of energy with all possible zeal that could be economically justified. According to the Bonn evaluation it cannot be foreseen how the OPEC countries will arrange their oil production. It is also difficult to evaluate the seriousness of the production cutbacks announced by various countries for 1980. The situation in Iran continues to be uncertain. The Saudis still have a key role.

According to the Bonn evaluation the policy of the OPEC countries shows that they increasingly utilize spot markets themselves while at the same time accusing the importing countries of excessive price movements in these markets. The flexibility of the worldwide supply is impaired by the producing countries' planned reduction of the contract amounts to the larger companies. The new channels, into which oil thus freed would be directed, cannot as yet be seen. But here there is neither the possibility nor the experience for global balance. This development must be seen as one of the reasons for the extreme movements in the free spot markets.

The positive evaluation of the present supply situation by the Federal economics minister is based on oil imports of 8 percent in the first half year of 1979, which is much higher than the rate of increase of domestic sales. This has led to a pleasant increase in supplies, which were of a span of 117 days at the end of August and thus 10 days longer than before the Iran crisis. The levels of the heating oil tanks of consumers were nearing the levels of the preceding year. Besides, this positive development was evident in all EEC and OECD countries. The increased production in Saudi Arabia was a contributing factor.



Lambsdorff's evaluation of the price situation was less favorable. With the background of strong price rises for imported crude oil an increase of prices is noted for light heating oil of 90 percent in October 1979 compared to the same month last year; the increase in consumer prices of gasoline and diesel fuel was relatively small at 14 to 18 percent. The price jump of the light heating oil can be explained in the Bonn view by the above-average high dependence on imports, the corresponding influence of the Rotterdam market, and by the fact that this product was the main cause for losses of German refineries during the period of excess.

Lambsdorff sees the clear progress of the "away from oil" policy and the first effects of the conservation policy and the higher prices in the sales and consumer figures of the first half year. For the first time the proportion of oil of the total primary energy consumption has sunk slightly below 50 percent. Sales of the most important product of the petroleum market, light heating oil, were 2 percent lower until August, compared with last year. There was 1.7 percent more automobile gasoline, although there was an increase of 4 percent of automobiles through August 1979. The saving in light heating oil actually must be seen as 5 percent if the cold winter is taken into consideration. On the other hand the growth rates of 12 percent of diesel fuel and 5 percent of heavy heating oil reflect a good economic situation.

In comparison with the average rise in consumption in the EEC of 4.3 percent the FRG comes out very well with 2.8 percent. In the view of Bonn even lower figures in Great Britain are due to weak economic growth and in France to the rapidly growing proportion of nuclear energy.

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CSO: 3103

## WEAPONS, AMMUNITION STOLEN FROM BUNDESWEHR DEPOTS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 15 Oct 79 pp 65-70

/Text/ Considerable quantities of arms and ammunition are being stolen from Bundeswehr depots. Security measures make it easy. Frequently such measures are provided by pensioners or by "failures in life" who are called upon to protect explosive material.

A washed out forest road high above Kaderh-Ilammerstein in the southern Black Forest leads to an area surrounded by wire netting. Despite the warning signs ("Caution -- blasting") and the barbed wire over the trellised gate, the area appears harmless.

Inside, however, are explosives. The site belongs to the Ernst-Mach-Institute of the Fraunhofer Society, which conducts experiments for the Bundeswehr out there -- with extremely dangerous materials which are kept in six bunkers. They are not safe there.

Not long ago thieves carried off 157 kg of explosives from this depository, together with ammunition for NATO rifles, as well as 700 blasting caps and rocket motor ignitions. As one of the investigators put it; "It's terrifying to think what a disaster could come about" from all this -- especially if the stuff has fallen into the hands of terrorists.

The fact that the loot has apparently been selected carefully and in a professional manner would point to such a suspicion. The terrorist theory is further supported by the fact that the 3 mm thick double steel doors leading to three explosive storage chambers had been blown off their hinges with a total of 12 charges of trinitrotoluene (TNT). And finally, according to the BADISCHE ZEITUNG, the fact that "one of the most noted members of the former Red Army Fraction, Christian Klar, is familiar with the area, may have played a decisive role"; Klar comes from nearby Loerrach.

It would not be the first time that stolen war materiel has reappeared on the terrorist scene. Between 1971 and 1974 "so many" grenades, antitank rockets, ammunition and plastic explosives disappeared from the U.S. Army depots in

Miesau and Wellerbach in the Palatinate that, according to an official of the Criminal Investigation Division in Kaiserslautern, "almost an entire combat battalion can be equipped with the materiel." A number of M-26 hand-grenades from the U.S. holdings in the Palatinate were later located during the attack on Bonn's embassy in Stockholm and in raids on lodgings of the "Revolutionary Cells."

The former Baader-Meinhof helper Hans-Peter ("Conny") Konieczny has already related how he, together with Gudrun Ensslin, had reconnoitred a "French ammunition depot" at Tuebingen's Galgenberg (DER SPIEGEL, No 42/1972). However it was "guarded with tremendous care."

Normally, however, the arms and explosive depots in the FRG, both military and commercial, are not guarded in such a manner. They are located by the thousands throughout the countryside like self-service stores, and there is no shortage of customers.

It is not only the dynamite lockers in quarries and cement factories, and in construction and demolition companies that are being looted, but also the unobtrusive depositories of the Bundeswehr in which equipment and ammunition is usually stored in areas far from the troop installations. Of these localities, which are divided into four categories, only the ones classified in the top security category are being guarded, in part by soldiers and in part by civilian personnel of the Bundeswehr.

Only because the existence of the bunkers, tunnels and vaults has not become common knowledge among interested circles, as Commander Hans Kruse of the Defense Area Command II admits, "does the Army frequently escape with just a black eye." When Kruse inspects ammunition depots in Lower Saxony and Bremen, "I recognize: How fortunate it is that this one or that one is not generally known" -- otherwise, he fears, "more things would happen." And in such cases it would not even be necessary to shed blood, as happened in the raid in Lebach, Saarland, in which thieves shot and killed four Bundeswehr soldiers in January 1969.

What is being stolen every year amounts to considerable quantities. Just in the past 6 years it amounted to 20,000 weapons and 2 million rounds of ammunition -- though this included many hunting weapons. Oberamtsrat /Senior administration official/ Wolfgang Henner of Stuttgart's Interior Ministry joked: "If these are used to hunt for game animals, they surely have a good chance of survival." And the Bundeswehr share of the stolen weapons is comparatively minor with 10 percent of the total. The dangerousness of the military materiel, however, is not fully reflected in the statistics.

Information concerning thefts of arms and explosives is being guarded by military and police authorities more carefully than the targets of the thefts themselves. Relevant reports and figures of the Criminal Investigation Division and the Criminal Divisions of the Land governments are kept under lock and key and are accessible "only for official use." This fact has led Carl-Dieter Spranger, CSU Bundestag deputy, to express the criticism that so far no

office has determined which security measures had to be overcome by the arms and explosives thieves. It cannot have amounted to much. The act is made easier for the intruders by the mere fact that there are no precise directives as to how arms and explosives are to be made secure by private individuals and commercial enterprises.

The weapons law merely obligates owners of weapons in a vague way to take "the required measures" against theft. The law on explosives calls for "required measures," but also in a nonbinding manner. And while every small branch bank is connected to the nearest police station by a direct line, in the words of a Swabian government business inspector, "so far only very few" explosive depots are equipped with alarm systems, let alone guards.

Thus it was only after the burglary at the Fraunhofer Institute in Kandern that the question was raised whether an emergency radio connection would be useful. Apart from that the security problem was solved in a typical manner: a village policeman observed the remote experimental area during occasional foot patrols. The Bundeswehr, although the employer, did not consider itself responsible for security.

But even if in theory all is being done that is required, in practice there are problems. On the one hand it makes good sense to banish explosive depots to thinly populated, desolate areas. On the other hand, the very consideration which dictates the protection of the population against possible explosions, increases the risk of burglary. If a Hammerstein farmer had not heard an explosion during the night and had not reported it to the police the next day, the Kandern deed possibly might not even have been discovered for days.

In contrast to the precautions against theft, the safety distances between depots and residential areas and public roads are strictly regulated in the "Appendix to Paragraph 2 of the Second Directive to the Law on Explosives." For example, in the case of a depot holding 50 tons of explosives, the nearest residence must be at least 810 meters away. It is also prescribed that the depots must be "made of nonflammable materials," and be "provided with an earthen cover of at least 0.6 meter."

In comparison the requirements for the protection against burglary are rather inadequate: Doors, ceilings and walls must be "adequately resistant"--whatever that means. The old regulation by the Laender, superseded by the Federal Government's new Directive on Explosives of 1977, were far more exacting. And a "Guideline for Explosives Depots 230" by Bonn's Ministry of Labor which is to fill the gap, has just been sent to the Land ministries for hearings.

A "Regulation for Storage" which has been drafted by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and is to be affixed to the weapons law, has been sitting on the bureaucratic shelf for the past year. The Hunters', Rifle and Commercial Associations think that what is planned in that regulation, is "too perfectionistic--including the fact that "storage containers" must have "bodies and lids which consist of at least 3 mm-thick steel plate."

Such security measures for private individuals are considered to be humbug, and not only by lobbyists. Oberamtsrat Henner of Stuttgart also asks: "Must we pester the citizens even more?" This view is seconded by Regierungsgewerbedirektor Helmut Kuehnle of the Ministry of Labor for Baden-Wuerttemberg, who is responsible for explosives depots. One must keep in mind "the relative means": "What is economically justifiable and what is necessary for security?"

After all, "everything is being done that is at all possible,"--in the opinion of Ministerialrat /Department Chief/ Hans-Joachim Loch, director of the Department for Trade Regulations in Munich's Ministry of Labor--the only land authority in the FRG which has a central register of all explosive depots and their inventories in the "Register of Businesses." "The weak points" are in the view of the civilians not so much private arms' cabinets and commercial deposits of explosives, but rather the Bundeswehr depots. And laws pertaining to weapons and explosives are not binding on them, but rather the relevant passages of the "Central Service Regulation 10/6" of the Defense Ministry.

Especially inviting for thieves is the state of preparedness of those men who frequently guard Federal German arsenals: the employees of security agencies. Among them are pensioners who are called "Blue Dragoons" in military jargon. About 3,200 such security men, together with 1,700 guard dogs, are presently in the service of the Bundeswehr, which will pay about DM 290 million this year to their employers for that service. The Bundeswehr also directly employs 3,500 civilian security persons who have 1,100 guard dogs at their disposal.

The armed forces have freed their soldiers from guard duty as far as possible, so that more time remains for training--and because it is cheaper, as Commander Kruse argues: "It simply becomes too expensive to put a submarine man or pilot in that position."

Recruits might perhaps suffice, but since the private security agencies have to accept the prices dictated by the appropriate Military District administrations, the Bundeswehr always keeps the cost below the amount which would be required if the security were to be provided by its own means. Some agencies, such as the "Detective Miha, Ltd." in Kassel, are thus no longer interested in such contracts.

The Bundeswehr compensates the security agencies at a rate of DM 8.50 to DM 11 per man and hour, according to differing rates in the various Military Districts. If the agencies pay their people standard wages (about DM 6.50 per hour for a guard on 24-hour shift), pay for Sunday and special duty, as well as make social security payments, they retain, according to the business manager of a security agency in Baden-Wuerttemberg, "at best a 2-to 3- percent profit."

Thus it is not surprising that some agencies reduce their operating expenses by not sticking to their contracts all that seriously. Guards who actually should only be allowed to be on duty for 312 hours per month, frequently must be on duty for 400 hours, and even at that are paid substandard wages.



Even worse off, however, are the approximately 4,000 German civilians who do guard duty for the Americans, British and French. A guard received a gross income of DM 1,600 a month for 272 hours on duty. And thus it seems to be obvious that there is a shortage of qualified personnel for the foreign troops as well as for the Bundeswehr. Gerd Mihm: "What kind of people do they get for DM 5.25 an hour? Shots can always be heard at the post."

A Swabian guard estimates that "up to 90 percent are people who have failed in life," who are being referred for hire by the employment offices under these conditions. Among them are many alcoholics who can take the strenuous shift duty--12 hours on guard, 6 hours standby and 6 hours rest--only while under the influence. "There is hardly anyone," according to a Hessian guard, "who sticks with it for more than 6 weeks," if he is not "thrown out for excessive drinking" even earlier.

Merely the difficult employment situation in certain fields still drives adequate numbers of men into the security agencies; such as wheelwrights, shoemakers and tailors. Except for those, the Bundeswehr guards are recruited from among "people who are no longer fit for their own professions"; possibly roofers who tend towards dizziness, office workers and truck drivers who have spinal problems.

Or as already indicated, pensioners. To be sure, the private security agencies are obligated to utilize only men between 20 and 65 years of age, who also have received "an adequate training in security measures and in the handling of hand guns." But in fact it is elderly gentlemen who are on patrol, who supplement their old age pension and participate in firing practice once each quarter.

Mihm says that he frequently "experienced fear" during duty in large ammunition depots because they did not have alarm systems. For example, a depot in Hesse which is 500 meters long and 300 meters wide, is being guarded by two men: One has his post at the entrance, one man walks the beat, and the two exchange positions each hour. They are in contact with each other only by four telephones which they pass on their beat. "If the guard up front is kidnaped," one guard speculates, "his colleague no longer has any contact with the outside world."

A guard at an arms and ammunition depot in Wuerttemberg complains that on one patrol alone he has to walk 7 km. And under those conditions he can at best check for "holes in the fence. As it is, anyone can climb over it anyway."

9410  
CSO: 3101

## ELECTRICITY SHORTAGE FEARED IN MID-1980'S

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 16 Oct 79 p 7

[Text] df Duesseldorf. In its Activity Report for 1978/79 the Association of Industrial Power Producers (VIK) in Essen warned against the "power gap" which will appear about the middle of the 1980's, if the worst is not prevented prior to that through a cooperative effort of government and industry.

The VIK backs up its skepticism concerning future power supply thusly:

Depending on the rate of economic growth, a reliable power supply in 1990 will require a power plant capacity of 109,000 to 116,000 megawatts (MW). Since presumably by that time hard coal-fired power plants with a total production of about 11,000 MW will be shut down because of age, this will require of necessity the new construction of 34,500 to 41,500 MW production capacity. At present 16,500 MW are under construction. Thus an additional 18,000 to 25,000 MW of new power production capacity must be built prior to 1990. If this is divided evenly between nuclear energy (basic need) and coal (intermediate need), a new nuclear power plant and two hard coal-fired power plants of current top capacity must be built each year.

These figures are based on an estimate by the DIW. If one, however, accepts the proposition, as do the VDEW and VIK, that the average annual production time of 4,800 to 4,900 operating hours as assumed by the DIW cannot be maintained and that the annual production time will be reduced at least to 45,000 hours, the additional construction need, all other things remaining equal, is already increased from 34,500 to 41,500 MW, to 42,000 to 49,000 MW. Considering the production of 85,500 MW during the late 1978's bottleneck period, that means an increase of 49 to 57 percent.

Since one has to expect a planning, authorization and construction period for power plants of 8 to 10 years, and since no more than the 16,500 MW mentioned above are presently under construction, one has to expect a power gap which will increase to about 20,000 to 30,000 MW by 1990. From 1984/85 on the additional need for power production must be covered by the emergency and growth reserve capacity, which will have been totally used up by the end

of the 1980's. Thus from 1985 to 1990 one must expect constantly worsening power cut offs in the FRG, even without unusual instances of demand as can occur, among other circumstances, as a result of simultaneous and massive use of electric space heaters, for example, for the purpose of saving oil.

The VIK thus recommends, among other things, the following short and intermediate range actions in order to provide for the necessary power requirements:

In practice only the public and private sectors are capable of enacting actual power conservation measures. The measures for power conservation, however, do not have to be taken immediately, but only when the capacity begins to near its limits. The power industry must inform all customers of this fact in time.

There is an immediate need for a program to develop and test electrical appliances which can be voluntarily disconnected, and to familiarize customers with them, so that in the case of need the customers can respond without much advance warning. This stand-by program to conserve energy must be backed up with appropriate publicity campaigns in the mass media.

Continuing intermediate energy conservation measures are possible through technical progress in the commercial and industrial areas, as well as in the private sector. To be taken into consideration are improvements all the way from improved electrodes in electrolytic processes to washing machines and dish washers for household use which provide the same performance while requiring less power.

Public and industrial power generating facilities which ought to be shut down because of age or for economic reasons, primarily, however, because of their poor rate of efficiency, should until further notice no longer be scrapped, but should be mothballed in operational condition. These old power plants, mothballed as a reserve for a shortage in power capacity, should be reactivated in the event of need to assure the power supply. It is necessary, however, to provide in advance the necessary fuel supply and operational authorization for these plants. The resulting additional costs should be carried by the initiator--the state, i.e. by the general public.

The power producers ought to utilize to a greater extent the possibility of entering into interruptible power supply contracts with industry. These types of contracts which have become quite common in the gas industry are not altogether new for electricity producers either. Every electrical power producer could, for example, sell its reserve capacity without considering its true value but while still covering his costs to industrial customers with the provision that this power supply can be entirely or partially disconnected, either as a result of a telephone call or an electronic signal, if necessary after an appropriate advance warning, e.g. in the manufacture of products which are capable of being stored.

It may also be desirable to secure promptly and by treaty imported power from such countries which can still expand their power plant capacity, including nuclear power plants, in keeping with expected need and without the considerable hindrances which are common in the FRG. This, for example, is the case above all in France and the countries of the Eastern bloc. It ought, however, to be determined to what extent our Western and Eastern neighbors might be induced through long-range and firm agreements concerning nuclear power which would be used to cover the basic needs of the FRG beyond 1985, to construct the power generating capacity necessary for this arrangement, and to channel that power into our system. For this purpose, however, the common power system with the countries of the eastern bloc, i.e. the necessary production capacity and the transmitting stations to our system, would have to be considerably expanded.

9410

CSO: 3103

## ARMY FINDS LEOPARD 2 TANK REQUIRES MUCH TRAINING TIME

Bonn DIE WELT in German 31 Oct 79 p 1

[Text] The "Leopard 2," which the Bundeswehr is now putting into service, is the most effective tank in the world, in the opinion of experts. Nevertheless it cannot fully utilize its combat capability. The army lacks enough soldiers with sufficient qualifications.

An army specialist comes to this disturbing judgment. The department head for battle tanks in the army office in Cologne, whose analysis is shared by the high command of the army in Bonn, points to grave deficiencies in the personnel situation of the tank troops in the November issue of the magazine WEHRTECHNIK.

1. Some of the draftees assigned to them are insufficiently prepared, by intelligence and professional training for operating and maintaining the complicated weapons system of the "Leopard 2."
2. Even responsible tank commanders, a high percentage of whom come from the draftee contingent of the tank troops, lack the required ability.

In the presentation of the army office expert, some of the commanders lack not only physical and mental capacity, but also do without adequate basic training in the highly technical weapons system, and lack sufficient practical experience. The expert complains that this leads "to damaging the weapons system, crew training, and therefore the combat readiness" of the tank troops.

Meanwhile the Inspector General of the Army, Lieutenant General Hans Poeppel assigned great urgency to the training of the tank crews. His efforts are severely impeded by lack of money, however. Poeppel's predecessor Hildebrandt had already requested the higher service rank of staff sergeant for tank commanders, so that the soldier may stay long enough in a crew and get more experience. For a long time the Defense Committee of the Bundestag has unanimously supported the demand of the inspector general of the army.

But the Federal Government has not yet agreed. In the defense budget for 1980 not a single tank commander will be raised to the rank of staff sergeant, although the army will have about 100 "Leopard 2's" in its units by the end of next year from current mass production (planned by 1986: 1,800).



"Theoretically"--stresses the army office expert--a combat-ready crew for such a high-technology tank can be created even from among draftees. Joint training for 12 months is sufficient. "In practice," however, such a long period is hardly ever achieved. The reasons: "Either the commander is transferred because he has to attend his career course (a requirement for promotion--Ed.), or the driver, as a temporary soldier, is separated out after the termination of his period of service, or the good gunner (a draftee--Ed.) is ordered to a noncommissioned officer basic training course."

The warning of the expert is clear: "If the army takes seriously the role which it assigns to the tank in its combat concept," the quality of the draftees, the endowments of the commanders, and the training of the crews must be improved.

#### **This Is What Poeppel Says**

For the foreseeable future the strongest antitank weapon is and remains the battle tank. It combines in the best way firepower, maneuverability and protection.

The battle tank is the bearer of the dynamic element of the defense. A purely static defense without battle tanks with voidless density and sufficient depth is unthinkable.

CSO: 3103  
6108

## SAARINEN, SINISALO FEUD BECOMES MORE BITTER

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 31 Oct /9 p 3

[Article by Werner Adam: "Open Fight Between Finland's Communists--Only Regard for Moscow Is Still Formally Holding the Party Together"]

[Text] Stockholm, 30 October--After years of fighting between opposing wings, the Finnish Communist Party (FKP) now once and for all appears to be heading for a split. Notwithstanding earnest appeals for solidarity from Moscow, party Chairman Saarinen is no longer prepared to put up with the fact that his deputy, Sinisalo, as chief of the so-called Stalin communists, is claiming the role of "political and ideological teacher." Knowing that he has the support of the majority of Finnish communists, Saarinen has now openly spoken of a "forced marriage" which must cease if the minority sticks to its own particularist activity and does not subordinate itself to the party's overall interests. Sinisalo, however, countered forcefully, making it known through his mouthpiece TIEDONANTAYA that it was highly reprehensible for Saarinen to have started his campaign at a time when "all communists and democrats" were "needed for the struggle against disarmament."

The FKP by no means is opposed to Moscow. However, unlike the FKP minority, which blindly follows Soviet directives, the Saarinen group wants a line to be drawn between foreign and domestic policy. It has foresworn dictatorship of the proletariat, has professed its support for parliamentary democracy and for years now has participated in the government. The Sinisalo wing, on the other hand, violently attacks such "minister communism" and, unmoved, opposes its own comrades in the popular front government in Parliament, sometimes together with the conservatives. While there still exists a joint Central Committee, in which the "Stalinists" clearly are over-represented, there actually have long been two separate party organizations with their own publications and with cells fighting one another. A factor confusing the situation further is the fact that the FKP is represented not under its own name in the Parliament but, together with the leftwing socialists, as the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL). But at least in the Parliament the relative strengths are fairly clear. In the

200-member Parliament, the 35 SKDL deputies are composed of 6 leftwing socialists, 18 "government communists" and 11 "opposition communists."

The split right through the FKP, which now is becoming ever more apparent, dates from 1969. At that time the Sinisalo group had gone into opposition within the party after having failed to prevent classic apparatchiks from being gradually removed and replaced by more pragmatic people, in part from the trade union movement. A year later the two groups concluded a so-called armistice again, which proved ineffective. Despite the fact that Moscow more and more often summoned the leaders of the two wings, their alienation continued. Nevertheless there is puzzlement in Helsinki now as to what might have caused Saarinen publicly to fling down the gauntlet to his opponent Sinisalo at this very moment.

Since Sinisalo lost in the last parliamentary election in March of this year in his own stronghold, the election district of Kymenodalen, it may be that the party chief now wants to take advantage of the personal defeat of his nominal deputy in order to force his supporters to their knees once and for all. Some prophets in the Finnish capital even connect Saarinen's advance with the fact that in the past Sinisalo was able to lean on the longtime Soviet Ambassador Stapanov, whereas his successor, Sobolov, is siding more with the FKP majority. In no circumstances, however, is Moscow likely to abet a split in the FKP, if only because it is one of the strongest communist parties anywhere outside the Eastern bloc and a split would cast a very bad light on "international communism" as such. But whereas Saarinen and Sinisalo so far time and again have taken this very factor into consideration, trying to prevent a formal seceding of a split in the party which actually has long since taken place, the Soviets can no longer feel confident in this respect. A final decision in the fight which has now broken out openly, however, people in Helsinki presume, will not be made until the next party congress 1-1/2 years hence.

8790

CSO: 3103

## LCR, COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL FOUNDER UNION OF EXTREME LEFT

Paris LE MONDE in French 10 Oct 79 p 11

[Article by Patrick Jarreau: "The 'Recomposition' of the Extreme Left"]

[Text] The possibility of creating a party of the extreme left in France, capable of uniting the militants who claim this persuasion, and winning sympathizers who make an appearance at election time,\* and of influencing the evolution of the political and trade-unionist left, is the central topic of debates occupying the attention of the Revolutionary Communist League [LCR] at the approach of the 11th Congress of the Fourth International.

Founded in April 1969 (with the name "Communist League," which it changed following its dissolution in June 1973), the "league" was at that time no more than one of the organizations with the goal of building a revolutionary party capable of fighting the influence of the French Communist Party, which they accused of playing a counterrevolutionary role in May and June 1968. Ten years later the LCR is considered by many to hold the keys to an eventual integration of the extreme non-Maoist left within a unified organization.

The LCR owes this situation to the fact that through its successive crises it has been a privileged arena for the trends, temptations and conflicts that have constituted the history of the extreme left during these years. From Trotskyist purism, on which one of its factions insists, to Eurocommunism which holds some of its intellectuals in thrall; from feminism, which broke in through the doors, to ecological concerns, which find their echo there; from solidarity with the workers, which inspires a portion of its cadres, to the wish felt by many of its militants not to cut their ties with the various forms of social marginalism, the LCR, in its own fashion, reflects everything that follows from May 1968.

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\* 623,633 votes in the European election of 10 June

For this reason the league maintains relations with organizations of a less ecumenical cast. The workers' struggle, which gives first priority to action in worker surroundings, often turns to the LCR when during an election campaign, for example, it wishes to address a round-up of sympathizers with the extreme left. Groups of less importance such as the OCT [Communist Organization of Workers] and the Communist Committees for Self-Management (CCA), attentive to confrontations within the social order encountered among the youth especially, find themselves at the side of the LCR in trade-union activity. It has not gone as far as the PSU [Unified Socialist Party], which lacks confidence in the extreme left and does not often engage in "union at the base" with the LCR.

The League's relations with the other great Trotskyist movement, the OCI [Internationalist Communist Organization] are more complex. The two groups are heirs to a common history, that of the Fourth International, founded by Trotsky in September 1938, within which a splintering occurred in 1952, giving rise to the two movements represented today by the LCR and the OCT. These two organizations are simultaneously separated and united by 25 years of complex disputes, occasionally violent ones, on the best way to attain objectives theoretically common to both, disputes that within the Trotskyist international movement become a conflict of tendencies.

### Three Great Tendencies

This historical and international dimension make the problems the LCR militants must resolve in the coming month. An LCR Congress is to prepare the Congress of the Fourth International, planned for the end of the year. The previous Congress of the International was held in February 1974, in a context that brought the Trotskyists to place their bets on the progress made by the left in Western Europe. Since the LCR's action in France had been guided with this in view, the breakup of the union of the left in September 1977 disoriented the League, whereas the OCI read into it a justification of its theses concerning the irremediably Stalinist character of the Communist parties.

Analyses by the OCI, which the LCR militants tended to consider archaic, were accordingly reevaluated by some by virtue of the fact that the rival organization was standing up better than the league under the shock of the breakup of the left, and was having its audience increase, particularly among the youth. The LCR Congress in January 1979 proved unable to settle the dispute between the militants favoring the arguments of the "Lambertistes" (from the name of Mr. Pierre Lambert, principal OCI leader) and those bent on preserving the originality of the League with respect to traditional Trotskyist themes.

In any event, the great majority of the congress condemned the effort by the unified secretariat [SU] of the Fourth International to bring about a rapid amalgamation with the Organizing Committee for the reconstitution of the Fourth International (CORQI), of which the OCI is the French section.



Concurrently the Unified Secretariat kept up its pressure to bring the LCR to a rapprochement with the OCI. A vote by the Central Committee of the LCR for a favorable response to a meeting with no preliminary formalities with the Central Committee of the OCI (Cf. LE MONDE, 9-10 September) led one to believe that a coalition had formed within the league against the Lambertistes and the leadership, such as Messrs Gerard Filoche and Charles Michaloux, who for different reasons feel amalgamation with the OCI to be a matter of urgency. Messrs Krivine and Bensaïd are taking pains to avoid a polarization between the advocates and the adversaries to amalgamation, by insisting on the international dimension of the debate and thus attempting to constitute a rallying point for the militants brought to a halt by the complexity of the questions being put before them.

The search for an agreement between the Unified Secretariat of the Fourth International and the CORQI is in fact a response on the part of the "historic" leaders, Messrs Ernest Mandel (SU) and Pierre Lambert (CORQI) to the concern for assuring the cohesion of the Trotskyist movement on the eve of what they believe to be a crisis-period of the traditional workers' parties. They want the Congress of the Fourth International to adopt texts capable of satisfying the three great tendencies that divide the movement: the majority, represented essentially by the LCR and the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP, USA); the Morenistas named for Mr. Moreno, leader of the Argentine Socialist Workers' Party, very influential in Latin American sectors; the Lambertistes, close to the positions expressed outside the International by the CORQI.

Outside of the question of relations between the LCR and the OCI, two problems confront the leadership of the International. On the one hand, the Nicaraguan revolution, concerning which the Morenistas had such reservations that they put together an "International Simon Bolivar Brigade" in Nicaragua which conducted its own policy without regard for the Sandinista Front, with which the Unified Secretariat, contrariwise, was making an effort to establish relations. The action of this brigade was condemned by the Unified Secretariat, provoking lively reactions on the part of the Morenistas and Lambertistes. The problem overarching this one is the analysis the Trotskyists make of the evolution of the Cuban regime, and the dependency on Moscow it risks getting the Sandinistas involved in.

As for the second, the Unified Secretariat had submitted for discussion by the sections a text on socialist democracy, which represented a new departure with respect to the restrictive concepts of the Trotskyists on this question. The Morenistas and the Lambertistes, having expressed their nonconcurrence with this paper, the Unified Secretariat ruled that it should not be put to a vote, but only submitted to examination by the Congress. The Central Committee of the LCR decided that it would vote on this text at its own Congress.

Concurrently with preparation for the meeting of the Fourth International, the league is following through in the process of amalgamation with the

currents of thought of those who left the OCT last spring (LE MONDE, 11 July). For Messrs Krivine and Bensaid it is a matter of politically balancing, if not numerically, the prospect of fusion with the OCI. The militants of the OCT who wanted to rejoin the LCR, of which some, such as Mr. Isaac Joshua, are former members, are in fact defending critical positions in connection with the evolution of the extreme left and place emphasis on the point that its "reconstitution" must be an opening towards the outside, and not a withdrawal back into the narrow historic fundamentals.

2750

CSO: 3100

## SOCIALIST PARTY'S 1981 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY DEVELOPMENTS

## Mitterrand-Rocard Rivalry

Paris LE FIGARO in French 9 Oct 79 p 7

[Article by Edmond Bergheaud]

[Text] One of Francois Mitterrand's strengths is his silence. His rivals hammer away at him (true, he returns the blows), his friends press him to divulge his intentions. But the first secretary of the PS [Socialist Party] takes his own time and selects his own moment to reveal his major plans.

This silence has for the time being become one of the major pieces in this cold-war game that has already begun and that will end on the night of the second round of the 1981 presidential election.

Francois Mitterrand has several times reiterated that he is in no particular hurry. And on 5 October, in an interview with LE MONDE, he said, "The response can wait. The polls will not govern my decision." But he also said, "Is not the presidential election the next due-date by which the opposition, having become the majority, can, under civil peace conditions, come to power?"

Perhaps this delaying tactic would be the best possible one if the first secretary were leading a united party. But this is not exactly the case. The Metz congress ended up in the formation of an expedient majority, when the first secretary of the PS, faced with the reservations put forth by Pierre Mauroy and Michel Rocard, found it necessary to form an alliance with the PS's leftwing, the CERES [Socialist Center for Studies, Research and Education].

Francois Mitterrand would like to delay announcing his possible candidacy until the "socialist platform," which will in fact be the presidential candidate's platform, has been finally put into black and white. But the

drafting of this platform, to the extent that, influenced by the CERES, it shifts the party's options leftwards—with Francois Mitterrand's blessing, of course—is the focal point of new frictions among the various tendencies within the party.

#### Past and Present

But Mitterrand's silence is opposed by the posture of Michel Rocard. Public opinion polls make him a potential candidate, showing a large bias in favor of the deputy from Nièvre. Their rivalry is characterized by their opposite approaches on policy, particularly in the economic domain, of course. But there is also a generation gap. The first secretary was a minister 11 times under the 4th Republic and has lost three attempts to take the Elysee. Rightly or wrongly, his image is that of a man of the past. By contrast, Michel Rocard's is that of a man of the present, with a grasp of complex economic problems, in tune with modern France, and more taken up with reforms than with revolution.

Rocard's statements, however, where they concern his own candidacy, are not without their ambiguity. At the Metz congress, he asserted to Mitterrand: "My opposition will not be that of a rival. You will be the first among us to make the decision. I will not be a candidate against you."

Several days later, however, he stated to RADIOSCOPIE: "At Metz, I said what needed to be said, that the idea of a struggle between individuals within the party is to be excluded. What remains is that the party must express itself, after facing up to its internal pressures and influences and finally deciding what it wants to do." This is to say that as far as the presidential candidacy is concerned, no hypothesis is to be excluded...

Michel Rocard, accused of the sin of social democracy by the PCF, tried to give the PC the wink by denouncing the "anticommunist bias" of Jean Poperen, who had "alluded to collusion between the USSR and the PCF." In vain. Better still, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, file leader of the CERES and declared rival of the mayor of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, accused the latter of having played a "major part in the defeat of the left. Is it a mere coincidence that the 1977 rupture was on the issue of nationalizations, which the PS had placed under his responsibility?"

#### Impatience Within the PS

This provided Charles Fiterman, member of the PCF secretariat, the occasion to emphasize that that position was exactly the position of Francois Mitterrand. In sum, the difference between these two socialists is like the difference between a white hat and a white-colored hat, according to Fiterman.

Perhaps, though, this is merely a tactical posture on the part of the communists, who mean to reserve their final attitude until the withdrawal

of candidates for the second round of presidentials, in the event, of course, that the socialist candidate should come out ahead of the communist.

A Mitterrand-Rocard rivalry? There is no such thing, say the socialists. Nevertheless, the statements in favor of one or the other are growing in number. Pierre Mauroy thinks the first secretary is the best possible candidate and that "any other but he, today, would divide the party." Jean-Pierre Chevenement is categorical: "Mauroy and Rocard are poor choices as candidates." Jean-Pierre Cot, deputy from Savoy, thinks the opposite: "Rocard is the best candidate we can field against Valery Giscard d'Estaing."

This battle has generated a certain impatience within the PS, and this is the main reason why Francois Mitterrand's friends are pressing him for his decision, since, looking beyond the presidential election, it is the future of the PS that is at stake. The socialists themselves recognize this: a new defeat will crush them. This is the stake in the Francois Mitterrand-Michel Rocard rivalry.

#### Rocard On Poll Results

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Oct 79 p 14

[Text] Mr Michel Rocard, socialist deputy from the Yvelines, in an interview granted to FIGARO-DIMANCHE, and published on Sunday 7 October, reaffirmed that he will not run against the first secretary of the PS as a candidate to the presidential election. He said, "The first decision on this question will not be mine." Asked whether he was or was not "happily surprised" to learn that the polls "put him in a position to beat Mr Mitterrand," Mr Rocard answered, "I shall first take issue with your phrase "in a position to beat Francois Mitterrand," which strikes me as tendentious... French political life is very difficult at this moment and the French people's resentment is being expressed as disagreement with their parties, and I understand them. This is exactly why I am fighting for the return to public esteem of parties that are sound, effective and radiant. I am deeply concerned about mine...which is not doing too well--which is not improving--and my objective is to avoid its disintegration.

"What interests me is to beat the president of the republic. Why? Because this man, though brilliant, intelligent, is unable to run the machinery of state. After 5 and 1/2 years in office, not a single in-depth reform has resulted. (...)

"The only point that could interest me in a poll is whether the candidate of the left in the first round can be more than the mere mouthpiece of the left in the second round, that is: Can he develop the necessary momentum to win? This would give us something to work with. But there is no evident reason why I should be that candidate, any more than there is to consider these polls definitive. For the moment, the primary objective



of the left must be, above all, to work out a message and a platform. I am fighting in a disciplined and loyal manner for the Socialist Party's propositions to be the best ones. Our message has become blurred and must be revised."

After criticizing as "Manichaeism" the "condemning of all the public officials of this country," and exhorting the political parties to "not sacrifice to flights of demagoguery," Mr Rocard referred to the problem of unifying the left, saying, "I think it is wrong to pretend, to act as if a joint platform can be patched together from options and choices that are fundamentally different. For my part, I argue that unity is possible only if it recognizes the right to differ. Opinion, after being informed, should have the choice between two alternative versions, and the process of examining these versions should permit the choice to be clarified democratically. But this demands an ascesis: a self-imposed respect for each other."

#### Appeal By Mr Hernu In Favor of Mr Mitterrand

For his part, Mr Hernu, PS deputy from the Rhone and mayor of Villeurbanne, said on Sunday 7 October, "As soon as the PS shall have decided on its platform, it should proceed to selection of its presidential candidate. Of course, Francois Mitterrand must make his decision, but all sectors, all federations that desire his candidacy should send in petitions to this effect. The fact is that as soon as the PS has its candidate and its platform, everything will change: the polls, the reactions of the PCF, the off-guard wait within the PS. The 'no to Mitterrand' cartel will be recognized for what it is: a summit operation, in that at the grassroots it is the desire for unity of the popular forces that predominates."

On Saturday 6 October, Mr Mauroy, mayor of Lille said at Cambrai in regard to the PS, "It is up to Mr Mitterrand to say whether or not he will be a candidate." The deputy from the Nord added, "Clearly, it is up to him to make his decision. There is no other way to look at the terms of the problem."

#### Rocard on Mitterrand Candidacy

Paris LE FIGARO in French 15 Oct 79 p 6

[Text] During the "Press Club" program on European Channel 1 last night, Michel Rocard repeated what he had already asserted at the Metz congress: He will not run against Francois Mitterrand for the party's candidacy to the 1981 presidential elections.

And what if Mitterrand is not a candidate? "It will be up to the socialists to select one in accordance with the procedures laid down in our constitution and by laws 'but' any candidate who would split his own party would be a poor candidate."

Michel Rocard responded to the question, "Is the first secretary a good candidate?", saying, "If he is the candidate chosen by the PS he is a good candidate. If he is chosen he will have my support, the more solidly so to the extent that he pushes for a socialist program more and more geared to the difficulties of the situation we face."

Does Michel Rocard personally advocate Francois Mitterrand to be the socialist candidate? "I have no personal opinion in the matter, no comment..."

With regard to the socialist platform drafted by Jean-Pierre Chevenement and on which the different tendencies within the PS are now working, Michel Rocard said he thinks it is "normal" that the majority that emerged from the Metz congress "colors" the draft. "We will improve it to the extent we can," he added.

"It is natural that we should concern ourselves with whatever in the socialist conception of the social, productive and political structures is likely to involve restrictions on freedoms, and that we reject it. In the light of Gulag and of Cambodia, we must start now," Michel Rocard continued.

"I find it normal and natural," he said, "that socialists should express misgivings among themselves," adding, "Socialists are fully capable of pulling together when they have to."

On the other hand, Michel Rocard ascribed the defeat of the left in 1978 to the PCF's refusal to go along with the joint platform "unless they could add a certain number of planks on which they were insisting but which in our view were unacceptable." He also reaffirmed the need for the leftist voters to "agree on a single line of action, on a single slate of candidates for the legislative elections, and on a joint candidate for the second round of the presidential election." "Clearly, there is no other choice," he added, regretting that "the PCF's current line of action has been decided for a long time." "I deeply regret that line of action, which rejects the unity of left, but it is a factor that must be considered," he emphasized.

Regarding the "consensus" which some reproach him with having accepted, Michel Rocard stated that "the only conceivable acceptable overture would be an equitable tax law, laws that would clean up the abuses in real estate operations, a strong general decentralization law... but that overtures that are only words and fine phrases are but poetry."

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## COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST, GAULLIST STRENGTH IN INDUSTRY

Paris LE FIGARO in French 8 Oct 79 p 7

[Article by Bernard Brisay]

[Text] "The current attempt to politicize the enterprises is contrary to the nature of the enterprise, which should remain a place of work, observing political neutrality. "—Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, January 1977.

Has this reproof been heeded? Quite the opposite. As of this fall 1979, the political parties (PCF, PS and RPR [Rally for the Republic]) are redoubling their efforts to install themselves in the enterprises, and cells, sections and other associations are fairly certain to grow within the walls of the enterprises like mushrooms in thick underbrush. This is an important fact that is likely to go unperceived. Political party activity in the enterprises suffered a setback immediately following the 1978 legislative elections, and some parties concluded rather hastily that an electoral rainfall would be needed to bring about the growth of political militancy at places of work.

But the three big parties (and of course those of the extreme left) are, covertly and overtly, making their installation in enterprises virtually their No 1 priority (only the UDF [French Democratic Union] is condemning this objective and is even refraining from seeking it). As of now, they are engaged in a fierce struggle for influence, that threatens to turn industrial establishments into unmanageable combat arenas.

Goal: 12,000 Cells

The PCF's goal is its traditional one: "Every establishment shall be a communist party citadel," Lenin used to say. Jean Colpin, member of the French PCF's Politburo and in charge of the "Enterprise Sector" at Place du Colonel Fabien, fully agrees, saying, "At the heart of our strategy is the enterprise." Undiscriminatingly for the PCF, the enterprise—and especially the big one—is "the nub of the crisis," the focal point of

its denouement," and the "pivotal point of the battle."

That much is well known.

What is new, however, is the fervor with which the PCF leaders are now pursuing the conquest of the enterprises. Increase the number of cells in establishments from 10,000 to 12,000: this was the goal set by the PCF's 23rd Congress this spring. The PCF's Central Committee decided recently to launch a 3-month campaign in L'HUMANITE and L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE to further strengthen the PCF's foothold in industrial establishments. A fact of considerable significance--and of rare occurrence--is that the PCF's members are being urged to abandon their regular local cells for the purpose of joining establishment cells. Article 18 of the PCF's new statute, adopted at its 23rd Congress is entirely explicit on this point: "The communist who works in an enterprise has as his or her first duty to be a member of that establishment's cell, to militate within it, and to help create the cell if it does not yet exist."

One swallow does not make a summer: The PS, like the PCF, has decided on a presence in the enterprise and--though belatedly and after many frustrations--is joining the battle for the enterprises. Francois Mitterrand has decided to take the matter under his personal direction. After having left this sector to the CERES [Center for (Socialist) Studies, Research and Education], to the Rocardians and to the followers of Pierre Mauroy, he has now placed one of his own men, Claude German (member of the CGT's [General Confederation of Labor] Executive Commission and mayor of Passy) as national secretary for enterprises. Eight permanent employees have been (or are in the process of being) taken on to energize the, more or less, 1,400 socialist sections or groups in enterprises (figure supplied by the PS) and increase this number rapidly to the goal of 2,000.

The other competing parties, however, are skeptical of the PS's presence in enterprises. "I find communist cells, I find leftist cells (very well camouflaged), but no socialist sections," says Philippe Dechartre (Gaullist leftist, former secretary of state for labor), who occupies one of the choice positions in the RPR's new organization table (published last weekend) as general representative of the AOP [Workers and Union Activities], the RPR's spearhead for the penetration of enterprises.

The struggle for implantation is not the exclusive province of the leftist parties, in fact. And since 1977 the RPR has gained substantial ground in industrial establishments. "Thanks to us," Philippe Dechartre asserts without hesitation, "the communist monopoly on debate has been broken." His goal, he says, is 950 AOP units. His objective: to hold on to the RPR following that General de Gaulle had attracted and to further the doctrine of participation.

Triple Offensive

The parties have thus unleashed a triple offensive for their implantation in the enterprises. The obstacles to this implantation are nevertheless considerable. The workers (and with greater reason their cadres) resent having to carry on a political activity on their work premises, from which they are anxious to leave as quickly as possible at the end of the working day. Quarrels are frequent between political sections and labor union sections. The latter (and even the CGT with respect to the PCF) resent this competition and this intrusion on terrain they consider rightfully theirs, not to say their private game-preserves. And lastly, the law forbids political activity within the enterprise, and the political parties continue to denounce "advancing inroads by management" that "victimize" their members. Cases brought to court by employers for political action on their premises have sometimes been lost in the lower courts but generally won on appeal.

Be that as it may, the communist Jean Elleinstein views it as now being a rearguard action: "Preventing political action in the enterprise is a delusion that cannot resist the forces of reality. It is a barrier which, like so many others in the last 10 years, is bound to fall."\*

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\*Jean Elleinstein, "Le PCF" [The PCF], Grasset.

However, a survey, for what it may be worth (true, it is 3 years old), shows that 48 percent of the French people are opposed to political action within the enterprise, as against 25 percent in favor.



PCF

10,000 cells

250,000 persons (estimate)

Strongholds: steelworkers; metalworkers in heavy transformation industries (automobile, aviation); "The 43" (43 enterprises selected by the PC and linked directly to the party's Central Committee)

Union affiliation (of its political members): CGT

Publication: ACTION (1.8 million copies distributed or sold, 0.60 francs)

PS

1,400 groups

and sections in enterprises

Strongholds: public sector; metalworkers; chemical industry workers

Union affiliation: CGT; FO [Workers Force]

Publication: COMBAT SOCIALISTE (new style in October 1979), 30,000 copies sold, 4 francs

RPM

950 AOP units

(labor and professional associations)

Strongholds: Usinor Dunkerque, Renault Flins SNIAS Toulouse,  
Peugeot Montbéliard, RATP, Citroen

Union affiliation of departmental delegates: 19 Fo  
17 CFTC [French Confederation of Christian Workers]  
15 CGC [General Confederation of Managerial Personnel]  
8 autonomous  
2 CFTL [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]  
1 CGT (somewhat undercover...)

Publication: INTER A.O.P. (25,000 copies mailed to members)

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## EAST-WEST MILITARY FORCES EQUILIBRIUM VIEWED

Paris FRANCE NOUVELLE in French 29 Sep 79 pp 24-27

[Article by Charles Haroche: "Strategic Problems--The Balance of East-West Military Forces"]

[Text] Are there disparities or a parity of military forces between the United States and its Atlantic allies on the one hand and the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies on the other?

How should one determine the new equivalence factors of the strategic forces between the two sides and establish the relationship between political intentions and military capabilities all of whose "threats" come from the East, it is claimed?

We have already had the occasion to show what lies behind this obsessional drive unleashed in France to make people believe in a danger of "Soviet threat" originating from a strategic imbalance favoring the USSR and its allies.\*

Without returning to the motives behind the "conditioning" of public opinion we would at least like through scientific analysis appropriate to its purpose to set the record straight. We thus hope to provide some elements of reflection likely to throw light on the existing debate on new strategic data.

\*See the article of Michel Charlot, "They Promote Weapons," in FRANCE NOUVELLE, No 1766 of 15-21 September 1979.

This "dispassionate" examination could not rely on sources and documents suspected of being partial and which generally reflect the intentions--hardly concealed--of the "hawks" in the Pentagon or NATO. Their periodic and alarmist analyses strive either to increase military budgets further or to lay the ground for reactivating the quantitative and qualitative arms race.\*

### Great Responsibility of the United States

The difficulty in this field stems from the fact that the strategic game has assumed an unprecedented degree of complexity and fluidity. Historically, it started in the 1970's and involves today, at the fringes of the 1980-2000 period, catastrophic projections as if the notion of "power politics" and that of "superiority" automatically implied recourse to a war of aggression at a time when thermonuclear fire could annihilate the whole of human civilization if not the whole of humanity.

In his book "The Great Surrender" Gen P.-M. Gallois had unquestionably shown how the United States, always anxious to preserve its superiority in order to preclude any possible challenge, had assumed the heavy responsibility of launching on a mad race to nuclear armaments and various delivery systems for the latter.

"It is indeed the combination of political and strategic reservations at the possibilities of a technology that they unceasingly promote which has led on both sides to this enormous accumulation of the instruments of annihilation. It so happens that, because of its scientific advance, it is the United States which has provided the reasons for this useless rivalry. No one can then say what the Moscow government would have done if that in Washington had stuck to the practice of minimal deterrence. The irreparable was committed. The Kennedy-McNamara team evidenced ignorance or duplicity and launched the United States and the Soviet Union in the most stupid of rivalries (see "The Great Surrender," page 70).

\*Among the American promoters of the present drive relating to the "Soviet danger" and who maintain close ties with the industrial-military complex, banks, and insurance companies servicing the war industry let us mention the very noisy "Committee Against Present Danger" created in Washington through the joint efforts of Dean Rusk, former U.S. secretary of state; Paul Nitze, former under secretary of state for defense; Eugene Rostow, former under secretary of state for political affairs; James Schlesinger, former secretary of defense; university professors; former directors of the Central Intelligence Agency; and others. All these individuals have recognized correspondents in Western Europe in both official and unofficial positions in the press and the other mass media.

However, the responsibility of United States imperialism being sufficiently established and perceived everywhere in the world--except obviously in the interested circles which make up the industrial-military complexes of the principal developed capitalist countries--it is important that one not resign oneself to the absurd.

The disappointing manner of thinking in France notably on these matters is rooted in their at times overly technical and grim character. It makes the current models of the arms race nearly incomprehensible.

As is known, the latter is deployed at three levels of activity greatly staggered over time: (1) That of basic military research; (2) that of prototype; improvement; and (3) that of missile mass production.

The performances of the rivals have qualitative and quantitative aspects so that today the replacement of missiles outdated by new vectors is done at such a rate that it becomes very specious to wish to determine, on the basis of a single type of weapon, if the advance made by one of the rivals in this field causes the disruption of a general and approximate equilibrium in the balance of forces.

#### Infernal Logic

Three aspects or internal dimensions of the arms race flow from this paradoxical situation:

1. Each party believes that it is obliged to maximize its performance in the face of its rival or adversary. 2. The race takes place under the impetus of successive spirals, either to maintain an earlier advance, to transform a situation of equality in anticipation, or to put an end to a situation of inferiority. 3. The rivals have various means of control (observation satellites, radar, and so on).

The deployment of arms in outer space--which can be detected by means of these various controls--leads the arms race to the field of the so-called strategy of position in peace time.

In other words, the level of political tensions which characterize the international context has a direct influence on the three feedbacks which typify the arms race.

We cannot here enter the mysteries of the theory of feedbacks and those of decision-making theory to which analysis often resorts. Generally, they assert that the arms race is determined by the international situation. They forget to say at the same time that the latter is conversely determined by the arms race.



It is also important to situate appropriately the national context of the rivals.

That of the United States during the SALT II [Second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] ratification debates and the role played by the lobbies which initiate horror story campaigns would deserve a special study of their own.\*

The domestic and international situation of the USSR and its socialist allies should be examined with as much care and rigor. To what extent is the arms race imposed on them not a kind of simulated war to strive to weaken and ruin their economies, check their development prospects, and stress their structural weaknesses?

Is the immense concentration of military potential, both conventional and nuclear, explained in the present situation by the concern of the USSR to protect its European flanks and its need to cover the nearly unlimited wide open spaces on its borders with China?

Whatever the basis of these geopolitical arguments the East-West parameter, generally considered by the analysts, should not conceal real local problems. And all the scenarios that can be advanced to shore up contradictory hypotheses prove to be hazardous.

For wanting to play Cassandra too much one risks getting involved in alarmist theories, all the more interested in creating power plays and those of pre-eminence more or less lost at a given point by one of the rivals as the negotiations and means of a relaxation of tensions would run the risk of being drowned in an ocean of illusions.

#### Distortions in Budget Estimates

The implementation of a program for the coming 10 or 12 years which the Atlantic countries propose to approve in December 1979 at the same time as the modernization and redeployment of their nuclear potential and the prospective 3 percent increase in real terms of their national defense budgets assuming that all these sacrifices are accepted would not be without effect on East-West relations. The backlash could easily return.

At this point of the debate the impact which external tensions, maintained artificially by the Atlantic Pact leaders, have on the national policies of the East-West actors brings into play three key variables in the decision-making processes of governments: The Gross National Product, the portion of this GNP earmarked to armaments, and the share of this fraction which is effectively converted into arms.

\*See second footnote above.

In this field the distortions in defense budget estimates are a constant feature in Atlantic circles in order to exaggerate the personnel and armaments of the USSR with a semblance of objectivity.

In the face of the distable nature--for several years--of the Soviet defense budget which has averaged 17 billion rubles, that is, 7.2 percent of the aggregate Soviet budget, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon have invented a completely arbitrary system of estimates. What is involved is what is known as "pricing exercise." According to the definition given by the CIA this consists in "estimating how much an armed force having the same number of troops and the same weapons as the Soviets and used in the same way as in the Soviet Union would cost the United States" (document published by the CIA in January 1977 under the title of "A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities for 1966-76."

But even despite these whimsical estimates the CIA had to admit that aggregate outlays for Soviet defense during the 10-year period under review was below the American budget for the same period: In the USSR it totaled \$1.16 trillion and in the United States, \$1.2 trillion.

To complete the comparative table between the military expenditures of the USSR and the United States, it is necessary to extend these estimates to all the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

A document of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the official organ of the United States government taking part in the SALT negotiations, was published in July 1978. It shows that for the 10 years considered (1967-77) [as published] the military outlays of the Warsaw Pact countries represented 73.6 percent of those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see tables below).

Table No 1

Comparison of the NATO-Warsaw Pact Defense Budgets  
(in billions of constant 1975 U.S. dollars)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1967	171.3	92.0	53
1968	172.8	98.6	57
1969	167.2	102.4	61
1970	156.5	106.6	68
1971	149.8	110.8	74
1972	152.0	117.9	78
1973	148.8	123.5	83
1974	150.4	129.1	86
1975	149.0	132.5	89
1976	146.5	138.7	95
	<u>1,564.3</u>	<u>1,152.1</u>	<u>73.6</u>

Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967-76," Washington, D.C., July 1978.

Table No 2

NATO Today

<u>Member-countries</u>	<u>Number in armed forces</u>	<u>Military budget of 1978 (in millions of U.S. dollars)</u>
United States	2,068,800	113,000
Federal Republic of Germany	489,900	21,355
France*	502,800	17,518
Britain	313,300	13,579
Italy	362,000	5,610
The Netherlands	109,700	4,208
Canada	80,000	3,635
Belgium	87,100	3,143
Turkey	485,000	2,286
Greece*	90,100	1,253
Denmark	34,000	1,320
Norway	39,000	1,291
Portugal	63,500	568
Luxembourg	7,000	37
Iceland**	----	---
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All 15 NATO countries	4,832,200	189,073

\*In 1966 France and in 1974 Greece withdrew from the military organization of NATO while remaining members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

\*\*Iceland's participation consists in its making its territory available for military bases.

The above table was drawn up on the basis of data from the Pentagon and the Institute of Strategic Studies in London.

Parity Established by SALT II

As regards the question of aggregate balance or imbalance of the forces, I shall also quote a highly authoritative American source. Indeed, at the time of his confirmation hearings before the U.S. Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations Cyrus Vance, a senator [as published] nominated by Jimmy Carter to succeed Henry Kissinger, declared: "I believe that there is general parity between the forces of the two powers (the USSR and the United States). In some areas we are stronger and in some others the Soviets are stronger. On the whole we should talk of parity."

According to the data made available by the SALT II U.S.-Soviet agreement, the facts of the strategic balance seem to be as follows for the two sides:

The United States has 1,045 intercontinental missiles (ICBM's [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles]) in silos including 550 Minuteman III's each carrying three warheads, 656 SLBM's [Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles], and 135 heavy bombers. On the whole it has 1,046 MIRV-ed [Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle] missiles. More than 10,000 warheads could arm these missiles including 2,154 earmarked to the ICBM's. The U.S. decision to build mobile land-based MX missiles and to produce new nuclear-powered "Trident" submarines is designed to offset the vulnerability of the ICBM's in silos.

The USSR has 2,565 vectors available including 1,480 ICBM's (more than 300 of which are MIRV-ed), 950 SLBM's, and 135 heavy bombers. Nearly 5,000 warheads reportedly arm these vectors. Of these 3,000 are earmarked to the ICBM's.

The question of strategic balance as it appears in SALT II considers only the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the arsenals. It does not take into account the problem of the asymmetry of geographic positions nor the political and geostrategic considerations proper to each and entailing varying interpretations about the certainties and uncertainties of security as a function of the international situation.

#### Criteria of Essential Equivalence

But once the principle of equal security is approved by the two sides, by which essential criteria can the degree of equivalence of the strategic forces be measured?

Once again I shall refer to an authoritative American source. In a speech that he delivered in New York on 5 April 1979, Harold Brown, the U.S. secretary of defense, stressed that "two concepts underlie the programming of the strategic forces: Deterrence and essential equivalence."

"Our fundamental strategy," he added, "demands that we be capable of inflicting on these potential adversaries such damage that, whatever the circumstances, this prospect would bar them from attacking the United States, our allies, or our vital interests. In order to realize this we need before everything a fairly invulnerable (survivable) capability for devastating the industry and cities of the Soviet Union. The capability of assured destruction, which is what I have just defined, is the basis of nuclear deterrence. To my mind it is not however sufficient in itself as a strategic doctrine. Fully effective deterrence mandates forces of sufficient magnitude and flexibility able to attack selectively a range of military or other targets and enabling us to retain a significant capability. This

capability to proceed with graduated reprisals in response to limited attacks thereby preventing the Soviets from figuring that they can secure a significant advantage at a given level of a nuclear conflict is essential to credible deterrence."

The hypotheses envisioned by Harold Brown have been systematized on the methodological level by analysts specialized in these strategic matters, especially in the major American universities. According to the book by Professor J.K. Davis entitled "The SALT II and the Search for Strategic Equivalence," there are reportedly three criteria for estimating the strategic forces confronting each other:

1. The two parties must maintain their second strike capabilities to survive (it being understood that the first strike would destroy land-based nuclear capability in a surprise attack).
2. It is necessary that there be symmetry in the capability of each of the parties to threaten the other, including by the so-called counterforce arms options.
3. The offensive forces of the two sides must be appraised as a function of the equality of the risks of assured mutual destruction.

There are many other American books which have tried to define the notion of "essential equivalence." Some use mathematical game theories, others use probability calculations or simulation of the strategic options of the rivals, and so on. Nearly all reach the conclusion that there is global strategic parity today between the USSR and the United States and their respective allies.

If there is dissymmetry somewhere it is necessary to seek it in the attitude of one of the sides regarding disarmament and military detente, the most urgent and most vital problem of our era.

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CSO: 3100



## GOVERNMENT ACCUSED OF 'LIQUIDATING' NAVY

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Oct 79 p 18

[Article by Antoine Sanguinetti, admiral, former assistant to the admiral superintendent of the French navy (ER): "The Liquidation of the Navy"]

[Text] The law of 19 June 1976, known as "military programing," had generated when it was discussed in parliament in May 1976 numerous comments that were as pertinent as they were ill understood by the deputies of the majority party who approved it unanimously even though they had themselves wittingly attacked it earlier. In general the criticisms bore on the document's lack of precision, qualified as a "blank check." Specifically as far as the navy is concerned, the criticisms denounced the cutback of the fleet. Indeed, between 1975 and 1985 the fleet will be reduced by one-third at least for lack of modernization.

In the enumeration of the major programs of combat vessels as well as the usual "small fry" covered by the law, the navy indeed is given funds for 11 orders for surface vessels or submarines for the 1977-82 period. This may seem reasonable to a layman but the figure averages less than two orders a year. When it is considered that the plan is to maintain a totality of about 80 combat craft with a life expectancy of about 20 years at most, this total is less than insufficient. It is a declaration of liquidation and, each year since 1976, the reporters of the National Assembly's committees--belonging to the majority party--have pointed to the fact and expressed surprise at it.

For, at the same time, France has become aware that the development of the international law of the sea conferred on it sole responsibility--at the economic level--of the third maritime zone in the world comprising 11 million sq km whereas issues of navigation control, accidents, pollution, offshore drilling, territorial disputes, and the establishment of fishing networks amply proved the need for concern about the matter. The government thus found itself constrained and strived on numerous occasions, in order to mitigate the evidence of its shortcomings in the naval realm to exaggerate the official data, all the more so as the nuclear naval deterrent force--to the extent of 90 percent--is included and tied to the naval budget.

Today the "Report on the Implementation of the Program-Law" introduced in parliament this Tuesday, 2 October 1979, by Raymond Barre and Yvon Bourges accordingly brings out, in an annexed table of deliveries, new items which were not included in the law: Diesel-powered or nuclear-powered missile-launching submarines or tanker-supply vessels. Through this means the number of planned deliveries is increased from 16 to 23--of which 13 were already built in the first 3 years--and seems to suggest undeniable effort on paper. For a while the navy would no longer be the poor relative.

Alas, as is too often the case the facts contradict an official speech which misleads only the hardlines and the simpletons, who incidentally are legion. One could not reproach them, incidentally, of wearying of a complex file whose access is difficult whereas those who are knowledgeable are obliged to keep quiet under the pretext of "discretion."

For in reality the line of conduct has not changed. What was not mentioned is that the totality of deliveries made since June 1976 and the vast majority of those planned until 1982 represent old orders and start-ups preceding the passage of the program-law or the present presidential term. Of the four C-70 corvettes on record the "Georges Leygues," [words illegible], the "Dupleix," and "Montcalm," which followed it, were laid down in September 1975. Out of the series of 14 A-69 gunboats started in 1972, three completed their trial runs at the time that the program-law was approved and their total was included in the budget. Of the four diesel-powered submarines which recently appeared on the record, the "Agosta," the "Beveziers," and the "Praya," whose hulls were laid in 1972, 1973, and 1974, were launched on 19 October 1974, 14 June 1975, and 15 May 1976, respectively, before the passage of the law whereas the "Ouessant" followed 4 months later on 23 October 1976. The two nuclear-powered missile-launching submarines, finally the "L'Indomptable" and the "Tonnant," the fourth and fifth in the series, were laid out in 1971 and 1973, launched in 1974 and 1977, and placed in active service at the close of 1976 and prospectively in April 1980, respectively. And the sixth unit was built slowly. Its hull was laid down in its time in 1975 but scrapped in 1976 following the personal decision of the French president.

All the craft which have joined the fleet in the past 3 years or will do so in the next few years thus belong to the, naval plan sought by [former president] Georges Pompidou in 1972 and scrapped by his successor as soon as he entered office. But of the 11 new units planned only 4 have been started after more than 3 years. As for the rates of construction--which are the other object of a program--they have all been slowed down, as is indicated by the dates. The fifth nuclear-powered missile-launching submarine will have required 2 years longer than the earlier ones. The "Dupleix" and the "Montcalm" will have required 1 and 2 years longer, respectively, than the "Georges Leygues." When will the most recently laid hulls be ready and how many will be scrapped along the way as others have been before them?

Accordingly, our leaders are claiming credit for the decisions of their predecessors which they have however halted or abandoned in part.

The wisdom of the powerful in an earlier period placed them above suspicion so that questions about intentions were not raised. It is a great pity that this ethic should have changed while so many questions are being asked. For example, do officials in high places rely on a reduction of our naval domain through overseas force reductions in order to correspondingly limit France's needs in surveillance craft? Or is it possible that officials have already concluded at their secret summit meetings an agreement to share the naval tasks recently proposed by the U.S. secretary of defense, Harold Brown--the United States supplying capital vessels and their allies the auxiliary craft--which would explain after all the present evolution of the French fleet?

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CSO: 3100

## FLOATING REPAIR SHIP ASSIGNED TO INDIAN OCEAN

Paris TAM in French 16 Aug 79 p 24

[Article by Capt Marie-Claire Simonin: "The Jules-Verne: Logistics Afloat in the Indian Ocean"]

[Text] The Jules-Verne, a multi-purpose repair ship is truly a floating base which can effect most repairs necessary on a vessel. In the absence of any land base, it has assumed since 1976 the maintenance of naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

There are other repair ships in the French navy, but none with equal capacities.

## A Floating Factory

The tanker supply ship "La Charente," the four escort dispatch vessels, the high-speed patrol boat the "Epee," the light transport ship "Champlain," the two dredgers and the transport vessel which comprise the fleet in that area depend only on the Jules-Verne.

This vessel is equipped with multiple repair shops for carpentry, rigging, motors, electrical repairs, general and precision mechanical repairs. Furthermore, it has 19 computer-monitored warehouses. These alone are valued at fr 40 million.

This floating factory spend 6 months--from November to May--in Djibouti, goes back to Reunion for the warm season, from May to August, and then begins its northward trip by spending September and October in Mayotte.

Until the end of August, her principal clients in Pointe-de-Galets in Reunion will be the supply and transport ship "La Santonge" and the patrol boat "Altair."

### A Veritable Hospital

Not only does the Jules-Verne provide logistic support to the French fleet, it also brings medical assistance. On board there are complete health-care facilities, with an operating room, a dentist's office and, most significantly, a decompression chamber, the only one in the Indian Ocean.

This permits the treatment of diving accidents. All emergencies are treated on board, for the benefit of the 300 crew members, sailors on other vessels and the civilian population.

The crew has a rapid turnover. On board assignments are only 1 year to 18 months long, for the "pacha" (commander of the vessel) Jacques Aveline, as well as for the sailor.

The Jules-Verne is scheduled to return to metropolitan France in 1981 to be examined from keel to mast.

9161

CSO: 3100



## PCI GOAL TO BROADEN LEFTIST ALLIANCES IN LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS

Rom RINASCITA in Italian 12 Oct 79 pp 9-10

[Article by Armando Cossutta: "Leftist Alliances"]

[Text] We have resolved to strengthen and broaden leftist alliances at the next election, because it is those alliances which have been best able to safeguard the people's needs and respond to the national demands for renewal. We shall never agree that there must be uniformity with the government's *modus operandi*. Absurd accusations of frontism. To seek and obtain a line of genuine and loyal democratic collatoration. It is essential to have a relationship of unity with the socialist comrades.

The accusation being made by the Christian Democratic Party (DC) about the positions taken by the Communist Party on the operation of local administrations is truly astonishing. "The communists," it is said, "resolving to strengthen and broaden leftist alliances, are putting problems of political alignments ahead of those of content; they are paying more attention to formulas than to programs."

This accusation is truly astonishing as it is being made by a party which has based its own political choices in recent years, above any programmed requirement, on the a priori exclusion of the Communist Party from unitary governments and, therefore, on an out-and-out anticommunist preclusion, imposing this choice from on high throughout Italy. And in this manner the DC proceeded to settle repeated local crises, situations of total lack of governmental capability, leaving the people's most urgent problems unsolved, and worsening the already serious economic and social conditions in many regions and communes. This is an accusation which does not affect us only slightly. Everyone knows that our activity is entirely directed toward seeking and putting into effect value solutions aimed at resolving the problems of the country and local communities. Right now we are confronting the most serious consequences of the economic crisis with all the energy we can muster. We are the protagonists in a mass movement aimed at assuring our fellow citizens better living conditions. First of all, of course, in the regions and communes.

In the same recent national assembly held in Viareggio, our effort was precisely to attempt to associate the proposals for the reform of the financing and organization of local administrations with the immediate and concrete needs of the people: evictions, housing, price increases, and public and social services; these were the main subjects of the discussion. The subject of an increasingly broader process of democratic participation was also discussed. In that assembly the government was obliged to recognize the magnificence of the effort local administrations (of which the communists are such a large part) have made in recent years. It did so with sincerity and not just as a matter of form. We are making a note of that. What the government has not been able to grasp is the new dimension, national, in which problems of development in the action of local administrations have become incorporated and are becoming incorporated more and more. It is not sufficient to assert that these administrations have done their part in confronting the economic crisis and repelling the destructive attack. Nor is it enough to maintain that the state cannot function if the regions and communes do not function. This is true. But only partially so. For in order to have the regions and communes operate effectively these days, there must be a qualitative change in the political and economic courses taken capable of evaluating and correcting the basic orientations of the state administration in the first place.

The urgent need for reform in local financing is recognized; but meanwhile, the temporary measures it has been possible to take and which, moreover, have had the merit of halting our dreadful indebtedness, the bankruptcy into which it was precipitated through the indifference and obtuseness of central governments and the financial condition of the communes, continue along a line which does not help resolve the crisis. On the contrary, they are making it worse. This is the 4th year that there have been temporary measures while waiting for a general reform. To be sure, this is better than nothing. However, their effectiveness has been rapidly decreasing, even over the immediate term. The current situation is not being confronted if provisions for reform are not included even in the temporary measures. This is the point the government does not grasp. We are in a crucial period; reform is needed. Without reform we shall not go forward. In fact, we shall not even hold on to the past; we risk falling dangerously behind. We shall not recover from the crisis with measures involving minor change. We need new directions, options which are qualitatively different, which will modify the mechanisms of development. Practically speaking, we need qualitative changes in our current productive activities so as to contribute to a change in the orientations of expenditures, that is, to develop expenditures for social welfare. And that is why greater, not fewer, resources should be given to the communes.

There is growing concern about the completely negative attitude taken by the government with regard to the regions. We do not deny that there has been a decline in the role played by the regions. On the contrary, we ourselves have strongly denounced that decline. However, our denunciation was based on the conviction that the primary cause can be found in the orientation and behavior of the government's executive branch, as well as in macroscopic defects in national legislation. The principal cause is that of considering the regions

... more administrative bodies carrying out the policy of the central government. Certainly, they must administer better. But not all regions are alike. All regions cannot be put on the same level. There is a wide gap between Emilia's and Campania's methods of governing. Things go badly not because there are regions but because certain regions are governed badly, in some instances in the worst possible way; others are even stretched to the limits of legality.

Now we come to the question of options. These are closely linked with the question of content. Anything but love of the communist formulas! Behind government formulas there are copious concrete interests, privileges to be opposed or protected, solutions to be acted upon or squelched, patronizing methods to be eliminated or supported. That is why we have again resolved, with great conviction, to strengthen and broaden--through the 1980 election--the leftist alliances; for it is those alliances which have been best able to safeguard the people's needs and at the same time respond to the national demands for reform, renewal and progress.

Our position has met with three types of reaction. On the one hand (the DC with Cava at the head), the communists are accused of wanting to abandon the line of democratic solidarity with a "sudden about-face" and with a contradiction, in their words, between our demand for a unitarian national government and that of local leftist alliances. This is a strange way to reason. Apart from the fact that the DC continues to say no to a unitarian national government, we have never maintained and shall never maintain that local administrations must be in harmony with the government's *modus operandi*, not even in the case of a government having democratic unity. This is a line followed by the DC and formerly by the Center Left but not by the Communist Party. However, the policy of democratic solidarity can be expressed in various ways, at national levels both governmental and parliamentary; and all the more at the local level according to specific situations and power relationships. Finally, in addition to all this, the facts show that the DC has not wanted and does not want unitary alliances with the communists (the honorable Cava has written recently that his party does not intend to participate in any alliance with the communists--not now, not in the future); not only that, but it caused the failure of the same far-reaching majorities of which the communists were a part.

We are not inclined to return to certain experiences. This should be clear henceforth. We intend to give all our support to the leaders of the regions and local administrations; we consider this not only a right but a duty which we shall never shirk. But we want to be able to give this support. We do not agree to have our support confused with support given as a matter of convenience. We shall impart confidence, and give our vote, to alliances which prove worthy; no one can oblige us to show confidence in those who do not prove worthy. We know quite well that there are problems of "governmental capability." We also know that these problems are not resolved by formal expedients. There is no government competence without proper programs and corresponding achievements. Moreover, "government competence" can also be aided by the opposition, obviously constructive in nature, without being a part of tenuous

majorities. The important thing is to seek and obtain a line of genuine and loyal democratic collaboration, eliminating all counteropposition and a priori preclusion. Experience has taught us all this. It is not a question of a "sudden" about-face but, rather, of a well-considered, slow, perhaps too slow, decision to act. Without the presence of the PCI, those alliances, even though with differences from place to place, have governed badly. It appears to us, on the contrary, that leftist alliances have governed well even without the DC. Our goal is therefore to strengthen and broaden those alliances.

There is another type of reaction to our position which comes, in this case, not only from the DC but also from certain sectors of the socialist party: the communists allegedly want a return to frontism. Alas! We are trying to achieve objective reflection (and also critical and self-critical) on the experience of the last few years and to indicate realistic perspectives for the future. No use. Everything is canceled out with a single word: frontism. The mayor of Milan went so far as to say we would like a sort of imperialism in local administrations. That is amazing. What imperialism? What frontism? We do not want large or small leftist pacts; we propose and support alliances based on the contribution, with absolute equal dignity, of all forces willing to work together with clearcut honesty and thoroughly democratic methods to carry out plans for reformation and development and struggle to achieve better living conditions. This would not preclude any democratic and renewal force. To achieve this goal there must be a relationship of unity with our socialist comrades; it is for this that we are fighting and attaching so much importance to a positive result of the meeting between the delegations of the two parties; this unified relationship could have a definite effect on the position taken by the DC with regard to the government of local administrations. It is different with the relationship of collaboration we have had, with mutual satisfaction, and which we intend to strengthen, with the Republican Party and Social Democratic Party. Still different is the political relationship we believe should exist with others, for example, with the Radical Party.

Moreover, leftist alliances are now open, not closed, not walled in. We resolve to strengthen and broaden them. And in this regard, despite the current controversies, we do not and shall not have any second thoughts.

8568

CSO: 3104

## PS CRITICIZED FOR PAST POLICIES, INABILITY TO GOVERN

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 26 Oct 79 p 5

[Article by Mario Cilia]

[Text] In the 1975 elections to the Constituent Assembly and a year later to the present Assembly of the Republic, the Socialist Party, as is known, benefited from many "useful votes," which enabled it both times to be the party receiving the largest number of votes and to rise to power. Paradoxically, however, those victories constituted the great defeat of the socialists.

Drunk with victory and incorrectly assessing their meaning, the socialists convinced themselves that they had the country in their hands and assumed a chauvinist cockiness that led them into a policy clearly characterized by ambiguity and incompetence.

Considering themselves to be the only political force with the capability to govern and, therefore, refusing any collaboration with other forces, the PS isolated itself and set off on ambiguous courses, seeking alternate support, according to the circumstances, although always favoring the communists, with constant concessions, while the country sank into a crisis that was worsening constantly.

Such was the case during the first two constitutional governments when a firm and consistent policy of national salvation was still possible and feasible. It may even be said that when it assumed the government for the first time, even though with a little more than 35 percent of the votes, the socialists had a margin of confidence or at least of expectations that would have permitted them to take action rather undisturbed and to undertake a realistic policy that could have made it possible to initiate economic recovery and to save the Portuguese from the distressing situation that was reached.



However, some factors prevented that from being so:

1. The lack of a realistic and consistent program applied efficiently. From the outset, the PS revealed itself to be a party without a philosophy, favoring ambiguity and demagoguery, when what was needed was firm and consistent action appropriate to the needs of the country. The socialists preferred opportunism and confusion to political realism;

2. Inability and incompetence. Along with the absence of a political philosophy and a realistic program, the socialists had a distressing lack of competence and imagination, from both a political and technical point of view. Incompetent and unrealistic, the socialist politicians and technicians compounded error upon error in all spheres of their activity, resulting logically in the constant worsening of the situation. Furthermore, along with this inability manifested in all areas of their activity, they pursued a style of demagogic activity based on slogans and the illusory conviction that it would be possible to govern the country in a permanent state of election campaigning when, on the contrary, what was needed was the creation of a climate of calm and seriousness, and realistic and honest action that would mobilize the population for the important tasks of recovery;

3. Political ambiguity and concession to the communists. Refusing alliances and agreements and isolating themselves from the other political forces with the chauvinistic attitude of considering themselves the pivot of the system, the socialists intensified the ambiguity of their actions even more, becoming veritable "mincing steppers" of politics and revealing even more glaringly their ideological and programmatic emptiness. Worse still, incapable of carrying out a firm and consistent policy, and exchanging it for the most brazen opportunism, the PS always pursued the policy of the communists, constantly ceding to their demands.

That was how all the "gains" achieved by the communists during the Goncalves era became untouchable or were expanded, enabling Cunhal's party to have a power and strength vastly superior to its real numbers.

4. The incompetence abundantly revealed by the socialists increased the temptation to satisfy an ever larger and more demanding clientele that had to be satisfied at any price, which led not only to the large majority of the key places in the public administration and the state enterprises being filled by socialists, even the most incompetent and least qualified to fill those positions, but also to the creation of many thousands of new positions with a constant increase of bureaucracy and inoperability. Thus the state apparatus became a huge monster ever more greedily draining the bloodless body of the nation. Furthermore, as is known, this is one of the most imbedded characteristics of Marxist, regimes strongly centralized and controlled by a monstrous state apparatus.

All of this led to the socialist governments becoming tremendous failures, substantially worsening the situation inherited from the Goncalves era. Therefore, it is easy to conclude that the "useful votes" given to the PS in 1975 and 1976 were not only useless but contributed appreciably to worsening the Portuguese situation.

Nevertheless, they were honest votes. They were the votes of conscientious citizens who thought perhaps a little naively that the Socialist Party was at that time the only political force capable of resolutely opposing communism and of salvaging the country.

But they were also votes betrayed and for that reason responsible in large part for the tremendous disappointment that was generated in Portugal; just as the socialists are mainly responsible for the discredit suffered by the political parties and by democracy itself.

They were votes betrayed because in addition to being incompetent, irresponsible, demagogic and, therefore, completely incapable of governing the country, the PS was and continues to be the best ally of the communists and has been constantly at their side, even when it pretends to fight them with words, which its deeds constantly refute.

Proudly Alone [Salazarist slogan]

Of the many errors the Socialist Party has committed, the most serious is the one that without doubt has been most harmful to Portugal and in large part responsible for the constant worsening of the politico-economic and social crisis: the refusal to ally itself with other democratic forces is by far the biggest and the one that has most disappointed those who voted for it.

In seeking to govern by itself although it had only a little more than 35 percent of the votes, the PS denied democracy and prevented the finding of possible solutions to reverse the course of events and to initiate recovery in a calm and realistic atmosphere.

The PS, therefore, assumed great responsibility by its irresponsible, tortuous and ambiguous activity, the more so since this activity was carried out when it was running the government as well as later, in the opposition, which means that the socialists do not deserve any trust, either to govern or to be in the opposition.

This is so because in a democracy, the action of the parties has to be assessed whether in the government or in the opposition, because both of these situations are important and both must be assumed with competence, honesty and consistency. And the Socialist Party ever more "proudly alone" has already revealed in both situations, and abundantly, that it is inconsistent, ambiguous and demagogic.

Whereas, the "useful vote" or tactical vote for the PS could be justified in 1975 and 1976, in 1979, on the eve of a year that is going to be very important politically--let there be no doubt about that--a vote for the PS will be a useless vote, a lost vote, or even more serious, a vote that will benefit the Communist Party, because each deputy elected by the socialists will become in the new parliament a potential ally of the communists, just as they were in the present one.

While losing votes, wasting them uselessly, is always a disservice to the country and to democracy, to strengthen the position of the communists through those lost votes will be a very grave error that no conscientious citizen should commit.

All the votes that in 1975 and 1976 were tactically granted to the socialists and that were betrayed must be recovered for democracy and for the reconquest of Portugal.

In order that on 2 and 16 December--days that we hope will be a great expression of dignity and maturity on the part of the Portuguese--democracy may be saved and Portugal may be restored, it is essential that not a single vote be wasted. And to vote for the PS will be to waste votes, as it was, after all, in 1975 and 1976.

8711

CSO: 3101

## CHURCH COMES UNDER CRITICISM FROM PS, PCP

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 22 Oct 79 p 4

[Text] The positions of the Church and of the Socialist Party (PS) and Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) regarding the role of the former in the area of political intervention were again yesterday the subject of differing opinions by each of the sides. The archbishop of Braga, Dom Eurico Dias Nogueira said in the capital of Minho that the Church could not fail to warn the faithful about the "incompatibility of certain party programs with the demands of the gospel, as well as the risk posed to their faith and religious freedom if those programs should be imposed on Portuguese public life."

At the same time, in Lisbon, the secretary general of the PCP, Alvaro Cunhal, said at a rally held by his party that "religion must not be mixed with politics." Cunhal added on that subject that "it is not legitimate to try to use methods of religious pressure to coerce votes for any party, specifically as is being done for reactionary parties."

Don Eurico Nogueira Dias, who was celebrating mass on the first anniversary of the pontificate of John Paul II and on World Mission Day, stressed that "the Church in Portugal does not have a party or take sides," leaving "that task to the conscience of its faithful." The prelate's homily was delivered at the Braga See.

After referring to cases of persecution of missionaries and other religious in Mozambique and Angola, the archbishop of Braga said: "Let us hope to heaven that we will never go through a similar situation in Portugal. But let us join action to prayer. Let us hope that the intelligence, intuition and good sense of the Portuguese and their appreciation of the lofty Christian values may be capable of warding off a danger that we wish to God were only imaginary," he added.

Immediately afterward, the Braga prelate said: "In voicing such warnings, Church dignitaries are not only using their right to expound the truth for the enlightenment of the congregation but they are fulfilling the inescapable duty of alerting the faithful to suicidal adventures of which they would be the first victims."

#### Soares Visits Three Bishops

Mario Soares also took up this subject during the visit he made over the weekend to Trás-os-Montes and Minho, where he contacted the bishops of Braganca, Vila Real and Viana do Castelo. In the second of those three cities, the secretary general of the PS declared that "the Church cannot in any way be on the side of those who want to reestablish the right to privilege, to reestablish authoritarian forms of government in this country."

During the homily delivered yesterday, after underscoring the neutral position of the Church, the archbishop of Braga declared: "Nothing and no one will prevent the pastors of the Church from fulfilling their duty. And let it not be said dishonestly that by proceeding in this fashion they are against the poor and are reactionary." Speaking personally, he added: "Those insinuations do not disturb me, nor do the repeated accusations of being reactionary or being on the side of the rich against the poor bother me."

The Braga prelate said further: "I have always sought to react against what I deem to be bad. In that sense, I am proud of the name reactionary as opposed to accommodating or timid, to subservient and static. I will react strongly against lies, despotism and injustice."

Before concluding his homily, Dom Eurico Dias Nogueira said that he will not be impressed by useless threats and that he will disobey without hesitation any laws and injunctions that try to restrict that urgent right and inescapable duty.

After seeing the bishop of the diocese of Braga, Dom Antonio Jose Rafael, Mario Soares told the press that at the meeting impressions had been exchanged about problems such as "the defense of freedom and certain human values, the heritage of Christianity." Soares added: "It is worth emphasizing these values at a time when important steps are being taken in our democracy, which it behooves us to consolidate."

The secretary general of the PS, who had a meeting in Viana do Castelo with the bishop-archbishop of the diocese, Dom Julio Rebimbas, said that the object of that meeting was "to counteract a tendentious campaign that is being carried out by certain reactionary sectors to lump the PS with the Marxist parties."



Following Mario Soares' reception by the bishop of Vila Real, Dom Antonio Ribeiro, no information was given about the meeting. The meeting, which was held in the Episcopal Palace of that Tras-os-Montes city, was justified by the socialists on the basis of the concern of the PS "to dialog with all human, political and social forces for the defense of democracy."

#### Cunhal Criticizes Episcopate

In his speech in Lisbon yesterday, Alvaro Cunhal said that the note of the Permanent Council of the Episcopate of 15 October contains "numerous errors" but he regarded as "positive" the clarification that "the Church does not operate in the field of party politics and consequently does not have a party or parties."

The secretary general of the PCP considered that the "proper place for a priest to campaign for his party and to dignify his own religion and worship is not the pulpit of a church but the platform of a rally.

"The PCP firmly defends religious freedom, the freedom to profess a belief and to practice a religion and is firmly against any offense to the religious sentiments of believers," Cunhal stressed.

Finally, Alvaro Cunhal recalled Maria Luisa Costa Dias, declaring "that it is not irreconcilable to be a communist and a Catholic."

8711  
CSO: 3101

## LARGE SWEDISH-BUILT FLOATING DOCK GROUNDED EN ROUTE TO MURMANSK

## Huge Losses Likely

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 5 Oct 79 p 25

[Article: "Storm Took Arendal's First Floating Dock; Great Risk for a Total Loss"]

[Text] Kirkenes--The Arendal shipyard's accident-troubled floating dock --one of the world's largest-- broke away from the towboats in a severe storm yesterday on its way to its destination Murmansk in the Soviet Union. The dock now sits aground at the depth of 7 kilometers in Soviet waters in the Arctic Ocean and there is great risk that it will be a total loss.

The giant dock -- 330 meters long, 88 meters wide and 30 meters high -- was tossed up and down in the violent seas, Lieutenant Sverre Sjastad, captain of the Norwegian rescue helicopter, tells the SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

"We couldn't go down on the dock with the helicopter but had to take the 14 crewmen aboard by using the helicopter hoist. On board the dock were seven Dutchmen and seven Swedes."

One of the Swedish crewmen tells us:

"The towline to the two Dutch ocean towboats broke early Thursday morning. We succeeded in getting new towlines fastened on board -- 1,000 meters long -- but they could not cope with the stress. The dock began drifting 6 nautical miles from land. Finally, it was clear that the dock could not be saved and the risk could not be taken of keeping the people on board."

The Arendal shipyard has had a maximum of bad luck with its new construction which was to be the shipyard's big breakthrough for alternate production. The dock was finished in August and the long voyage along the Norwegian coast and the Arctic Ocean was planned for 20 August.

But during the last test -- a diving test when the dock was lowered under water -- the alarm system failed and several of the floating tanks of the dock were damaged by the great vacuum pressure.

About 400 tons of steel had to be replaced resulting in a delay of several weeks. The delivery time to the Soviet customer had to be extended. On 10 September one was again ready to begin the towing.

But the weather outside Gothenburg was too bad with wind velocities up to 14 meters per second. The limit had been set at 7-8 meters per second for the towing out to sea.

#### Safety Measures

On Sunday 23 September the towing could begin. But at that time it was known that the weather forecast for the Norwegian Sea was not very favorable. However, together with the Atlantica insurance company special safety measures had been taken, among other things a second towboat had been rented instead of originally one and plans had been made for suitable ports of refuge. This time it consequently look like it would work, despite bad weather. But then the accident happened only half a day's towing from the goal.

11949

CSO: 3109

#### Dock Freed, Towed to Kirkenes

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Oct 79 p 48

[Excerpt] Kirkenes, 16 October. (Dag Pedersen) The Soviet giant floating dock which on Thursday 4 October came adrift in the Varanger Fjord and ran aground east of Grense-Jakobselv in Soviet territory was brought afloat yesterday afternoon again at 1400 hours by the Dutch rescue crews. Barely half an hour after it had been pulled clear, it was in Norwegian waters and is now on its way in toward Kirkenes. The large vessel, one of the biggest in the world, must be prepared to stay for the winter there.

AFTENPOSTEN was present in the office of shipping broker Judolf Torgersen in Kirkenes when the report came via radio from the Dutch towboat "Smith London:" "The dock is floating, she is going out," an enthusiastic radio-telegrapher called out. The stranded giant, which is worth hundreds of millions of kroner, was then back in its proper element.

It will be a long and expensive further trip for the dock. Ironically enough, it itself must be brought to a dock to be repaired before it can continue to its destination--Murmansk. The giant dock is 330 meters long, 80 meters wide and 30 meters high. In other words, it has space for three soccer fields with international dimensions, one after the other, and still has sufficient place for tribunes on the long sides. It is this giant which now must go to repair, and the experts in Gotaverken, where the dock was built, will now get the big problem of selecting a drydock which is big enough.

## Four Shipyards Can Take the Dock

Shipwreck manager Rolf Ljunggren of the Swedish insurance company Atlantica, which has insured the dock, tells AFTENPOSTEN that there are four drydocks to choose among in Europe. One is in Uddevalla, the other at Verolme shipyards in Rotterdam, the third at HDW in Hamburg and the fourth at Lisnavre shipyards in Lisbon.

However, the subject of the conversation among those responsible for further operations in Kirkenes yesterday was to find out how one would be able to tow the dock in to a mooring site at Kirkenes. The two large ocean-going towboats which are now looking after the dock in the Varanger Fjord stick down too deep. But two 4500 HP supply boats are lying in Stavanger waiting for the clear signal from Atlantica to go to assist. "It will probably cost half a million kroner extra," says Ljunggren.

For the time being nobody is thinking about towing this giant back down along the Norwegian coast in wintertime. It was disabled in a fresh gale gusting to storm, and it will hardly stand a new shipwreck. The plans are therefore to moor it in the vicinity of Kirkenes for the winter, more precisely in the Reinoy Straits. Yesterday a trailer came from Gotaverken with the towing equipment, not less than 18 tons of wire, blocks, pulleys, etc.

The dock was built at Arendal shipyards at Gotaverken on a Russian order and was insured with Atlantica for approximately 250 million kroner. It was towed by the two large Dutch towing vessels in the middle of September. But it broke loose in Varanger Fjord in a fresh gale. The helpless steel giant drifted toward shore at a speed of 6-8 knots.

## Exciting

It was the Dutch company, Smith International Towing and Salvage Company which was in charge of the towing mission and the successful rescue action. The Russians did not get involved in the action since an arrangement was arrived at after negotiations between the Norwegian and the Russian border commissioners.

The Norwegian border commissioner, Col Egil Lund, tells AFTENPOSTEN that the negotiations proceeded without problems. The Russians stipulated that the helicopter traffic from Haybuktnoen airfield at Kirkenes to the shipwreck should follow a special path and that it should take place in daylight. They also wanted information on how many flights they expected each day and how many people would be involved in the rescue operation.

Of course, there were Russian military guards on shore in the area.

"Since the dock is now in Norwegian waters, it is clear that there must be no additional traffic here, and I believe I am finished with this case," says Col Lund. There were exciting seconds when the two Dutch towboats started to pull the giant dock offshore shortly before 1400 hours today. AFTENPOSTEN sat together with the coordinator on shore, ship captain Ingvald Anfinssen, when the report came that the dock was floating again.

A little after 2200 hours on Tuesday evening Norwegian authorities gave permission for the Swedish-built floating dock outside the Varanger Fjord to come in and anchor in Norwegian waters. The authorization, which was communicated to the harbor master in Vadso, is temporary.

Department head Egil Amlie in the Department of Foreign Affairs tells AFTENPOSTEN that the question about whether the dock may be allowed to lie in the Varanger Fjord until next year is an entirely different case which must be decided separately by Norwegian authorities at a later point in time.

Amlie informs us that Norwegian authorities have realized all the time that the dock may sink in the Varanger Fjord and become dangerous to shipping. The authorization to anchor was therefore given only after the owners of the dock had promised a guarantee to cover the expenses if the dock sinks and must be raised. Norwegian authorities will now take a closer look at the situation to evaluate how long the dock may be allowed to stay in Norwegian waters.

Shipwreck manager Rolf Ljunggren of the Swedish insurance company Atlantica, where the dock is insured, tells AFTENPOSTEN that the captains on the Dutch towing boats realized that it was not in accordance with Norwegian law when the dock was towed into the Varanger Fjord. "But the ship captains used their sea crews and followed emergency law," he said.

Administrative director of Atlantica and the director of Arendal shipyards where the dock was built are coming to Oslo today with the help of the Swedish embassy to find a solution to the problem of placing the dock.

When rescue vessels from foreign countries towing a disabled vessel ask for permission to enter Norwegian waters to rescue material and valuable goods. Norwegian authorities centrally should react quickly without involving too many agencies in handling a time-demanding case. This is what Director Einar Hovding of Hovding Skipsopphugging tells AFTENPOSTEN. Hovding believes that the existing rules, which, for one thing, say that a foreign rescuer towing a disabled vessel cannot enter Norwegian waters without applying for permission via diplomatic channels are too awkward and inconvenient.



"A disabled vessel must generally seek shelter immediately," says Hovding. "It is primarily the rescue crew and those aboard the disabled vessel who have the best view of the situation and who can evaluate the seriousness of the situation and the danger of exposing valuable goods to risk.

"The way conditions are today, a disabled vessel outside the Norwegian coast must first contact its country's authorities, who then make contact with the Norwegian authorities via diplomatic channels. Norwegian authorities must then again contact the parties involved, the armed forces, fishermen, and the environmental protection department. Finally one is able to reply to the country involved, which then notifies the disabled vessel.

"Then it can often be too late," says Hovding. "I myself have been in contact with the Department of Foreign Affairs several times about this case without gaining acceptance for my point of view. It is to be hoped that the practice followed today will be changed, so that those who are in need can save themselves and their property as quickly as possible."

8958

CSO: 3108

## ARMY STARTS TRAINING WITH ANTITANK WIRE-GUIDED DRAGON MISSILE

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 26 Oct 79 p 26

[Text] Les Rochats, 24 October (SZA) The training of the first troop units of the Swiss Army with the Dragon guided antitank missile has begun. In the past few days the EMD [Federal Defense Department] briefed the press on the Les Rochats (Waadt) firing range on the training and experience with the weapon developed in the United States for the procurement of which the federal councils have approved a total of 583 million francs for the 77/78 arms program. It is to strengthen the antitank defense of the infantry and bicycle regiments. Due to thick fog, however, it was not possible on this press day to shoot properly, so that only the simulator equipment, with which most of the training is done, was demonstrated (a single real shot costs almost 10,000 francs).

At the present time the 15th Sharpshooter Battalion is completing its training course in Les Rochats, and in November the 110th Fusilier Battalion comes up. Altogether 94 new guided antitank weapon companies (about 10,000 men) will be formed--partly from independent battalions, transportation units, and over-strength units. By the end of September 1981 the Dragon weapon is to be fully introduced into the army.

The Dragon is 14.5 kilogram weapon served by a single man with a combat range of 65 to 1,000 meters. The shooter needs only to hold the target in the crosshairs of the sighting lens of his aiming device. A computer automatically ascertains the necessary corrections and communicates them over a wire to the guided weapon, which is then steered into the target. The degree of reliability is described as good. In all the training missiles fired in Les Rochats about 90 percent hits are registered. At present the equipping of the militia with the Dragon is being tested. A test with a militia platoon was conducted very successfully last Friday, all five shots expended having hit the target.

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## AA COMMENTS ON ISLAMIC NATIONS' NEWS AGENCIES CONGRESS

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 23 Oct 79 p 5

[Text] Istanbul: In a report by the ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY [AA] to the Islamic Nations' News Agencies Congress, which resumed its activities yesterday at 1000 hours in the conference hall of the Istanbul Technical University's Mineral Sciences Faculty, it was noted that "A fund might be established in order for the Islamic nations to utilize highly-developed communications technology." It was stated in the report that "In our age, mass communications take place by means of satellites. Communication by post and telegraph simply does not correspond with the realities of the age. The struggle against the news monopolies which circle the globe like a net, and the effort to neutralize these monopolies by means of competition, bring satellite communication before us as an inevitable consequence. With a common fund formed among the national news agencies of the Islamic nations, the necessary satellites could be obtained and these satellites could be utilized for the common purpose."

Efforts to Set One Against Another

It was stated in the ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY's report that "In the area of communications, just as in other areas, there are great possibilities for obtaining a close and lasting cooperation among the Islamic nations, just as there are also great difficulties."

Attention was drawn to the statement in the ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY's report that "Efforts are being made which aim at bringing the Islamic world under the influence of the Imperialists, and at setting one Islamic nation against another by inciting various separatist movements." The report also included the following: "The fact that, under today's conditions, media have become an international affair, dependent to a great degree on capital and technology, expands the various areas of communication on one hand, yet creates very great dangers on the other hand on the matter of some news reports being consistent with reality or of certain events being downplayed in some instances. In other words, the international capital and media monopolies play the events in whatever fashion suits them. On topics which affect the activities of the news monopolies and the interests of the international capital formations, they are inevitably unable to remain unbiased."

## Palestine Problem and Events in Iran

"We all know that the sacred struggle of the Palestinian people and their representative, the PLO, for the existence of an independent state has not been communicated sufficiently to world public opinion by the news monopolies, and that the facts are frequently completely distorted. We have not forgotten that, in the Arab-Israeli wars, the declarations of Israel's official spokesmen have usually been taken as the sources for the reports, or that, in news bulletins, the African peoples fighting for liberation are referred to as "the enemy". And we are not about to forget this. Also, the efforts to distort and thus pass off onto world public opinion the recent events in Iran and the honorable struggle of the Iranian people are still vivid in our memories."

On the occasion of the Islamic Nations' News Agencies Congress, which has begun its deliberations in Istanbul, Cahit Karakas, Chairman of the National Assembly, congratulated the ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY, which arranged the congress.

In a message of congratulation sent to AA General Director Aytekin Yildiz, Karakas said that "There is no doubt that our national news agency has performed a very valuable service to our nation and to our friends the Islamic nations."

### Karakas' Message

National Assembly Chairman Cahit Karakas' message of congratulation was as follows:

"The connection of the desired establishment of a new order in communications with the search for a new world economic order is being stressed ever more emphatically. For this reason, the news agencies of the Islamic nations must initiate an approach which will strengthen cooperation in the economic and technical areas.

"Our proposal is, by putting emphasis on the services of the news agency that provide economic news, to augment these services with journalist-economists. Thus those officials in our nations who have the duty of making economic decisions, as well as businessmen and industrialists, will be able to get such information first hand."

### Essential of Journalism

In a TGS [Turkish Journalists Union] communication which stated that "Journalists must write in opposition to warmongering and racial discrimination," the necessary measures to be taken towards developing cooperation among the news agencies of the Islamic nations were listed as follows:

-- The efforts required in order for the Islamic nations' news agencies to open bureaus in other nations should be initiated at once. In this way, efficiency and speed in the transmission of news could be gained.

— Ways of increasing the cooperation between news agencies and institutions of the press should be studied. Toward this end, in all Islamic countries, effective representation of the members of the press within the management of the news agencies must be secured.

— A common understanding must be reached on the new, and newly developing, conceptions of freedom of communications, and serious attention must be given to the realization of these concepts.

It was stated that, in order for the Islamic nations' news agencies to be able to compete with the news monopolies, they must utilize communications satellites.

The ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY, in a communication to the Islamic Nations' News Agencies Congress, said that it would "mobilize all its resources in order to achieve cooperation."

It was proposed that the International Islamic News Agency Center be moved to Istanbul.

The ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY, in a report to the Islamic Nations News Agencies Congress which is in session in Istanbul, said that these nations' news agencies must utilize communications satellites if they are to be able to compete with the news monopolies.

#### International News Monopolies

Noting that "Such activities by the international news monopolies, and their efforts to create a biased world opinion, have been dealt with in the United Nations General Assembly," the ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY report stated that, following the resolution on the "new economic order" accepted by the non-aligned nations in 1974, new institutions in the field of communications were created, and that the non-aligned nations' news agency organization and the International Islamic News Agency were founded as a result of these developments.

#### Proposals

Stating that "There is no doubt but that the cooperation which will be created will reach a great dimension within a short time," the ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY report also said that "As the ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY, we are at the service of this noble association, along with all our technical resources and facilities."

In the report presented by the ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY, the following views were included on the topic of measures which could be taken to promote cooperation among the Islamic Nations' News Agencies:

— In order to benefit from modern technology, the Islamic nations should create a fund through the various national news agencies. By means of this fund, a communications network could be established among the various Islamic nations.



— For the sake of healthy communications, the telephone and telegraph fees established by the state in these countries could be utilized in a manner more beneficial to mass communications.

— The news monopolies can distort the news, or else they can present it in accordance with the faction to which they belong. If we can bring about an exchange of news among ourselves, even if a little late, the international news agencies will either give up the idea of distorting the news, or else, knowing that the truth can be learned about news which they want to distort, they will be forced to confirm their reports. It is just this which is the goal of this Congress. There is no need to tremble before the monopolies or to despair of our undertaking.

— The national news agencies of the Islamic nations will be able to subscribe to each other's services along the lines of principles which will be delineated. And as the flow of news will be carried out by means of satellites, communications will reach truly modern speed.

— In the event that the International Islamic News Agency Center is moved to Istanbul, at the intersection of three continents, AA will furnish all the necessary land and buildings.

Kurkcuoglu, maintaining that "The foreign broadcasts of the TRT Turkish Radio and Television Administration are symbolic," pointed to the different approach in other nations and said that "For instance, when you watch the BBC, you feel yourself to be in the center of the world."

Yildiz: Common Approach Achieved

ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY General Director Aytekin Yildiz, the chairman of the congress, who spoke following the discussion of Hacettepe University faculty member Dr. Ertugrul Ozkok's report, announced that "A unity of opinion and approach has been achieved on the topics suggested in a concrete fashion in Ozkok's report."

Yildiz said that the approach arrived at on Ozkok's proposals for "the establishment in Istanbul of an education, research, and training center for the Islamic Nations' News Agencies, and the formation of a research group to examine topics related to cooperation among the Islamic Nations' News Agencies" would be discussed again during the preparation of the joint communique which would be published at the conclusion of the conference.

AA General Director Aytekin Yildiz said that "The transformation of all these concerns into a concrete project will hopefully occur during this congress."

Reporting that it was the first time that the Islamic Nations' News Agencies have held a congress, ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY General Director Aytekin Yildiz said that "The fact that the Congress is being held in Turkey is of great importance."

In his address while opening the Islamic Nations' News Agencies Congress arranged by ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY, Yildiz, stating that "The Ecevit government intends to increase the existing cooperation with the Islamic nations in every field," noted that "The Congress has been arranged in accordance with this policy."

AA General Director Aytekin Yildiz said later that:

"Although the ties and relations between Turkey and the other Islamic nations go back a very long way, we currently have a sterile situation with regard to the flow of news. One of the chief reasons for our convening this congress in Turkey is to promote the exchange of news between Turkey and the Islamic nations and to increase technical cooperation in the journalistic and news agency fields."

On the other hand, ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY Executive Board member Erdogan Tuncer said that "In the event that the various Islamic nations are unable to bring about cooperation among their news agencies, the international news agencies will go on presenting the news in the form that suits them."

Speaking during the discussions of the various reports on the second day of the Islamic Nations' News Agencies Congress, Tuncer claimed that "Engaging in academic discussions could distract the Congress from its purpose" and said "Regardless of our political systems, financial conditions, and technological resources, we are obliged to bring about cooperation among the news agencies of the different Islamic countries. Therefore, we have to come up with concrete solutions."

Stating that "Just as the news agencies of all the Islamic nations, the ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY exists only due to state support," Tuncer later spoke as follows:

"As the ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY, we expect the congress to yield realistic solutions by keeping the various nations' political and technical structures in mind."

Let Us Unite, No Matter What the Decision

"When we deal with the Islamic nations as developing nations, it is impossible to think of the news agencies as separate from the nations themselves. To act on the basis of political opinions keeps the congress from reaching its expected goals. Let us unite, no matter what the decision is on which we unite; for it is impossible to ignore the news agencies, which have become a global monopoly."

Governments and News Agencies

In the final portion of his address, AA Executive Board member Erdogan Tuncer pointed out that some delegates had stated that the news agencies are under the influence of their governments. He said that "The governments do have influence

over the news agencies. But it cannot be denied that the news agencies also affect the governments; this influence will emerge once again with cooperation among the news agencies of the Islamic nations."

#### Agree to Promote Cooperation

At the end of the first day of the Islamic Nations' News Agencies Congress, agreement was reached on the topics of establishing an education, research, and training center in Istanbul for the Islamic Nations' News Agencies and increasing the effectiveness of the INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC NEWS AGENCY and of the news from Islamic nations within the world flow of news.

#### Participants in Congress

News agency General Directors and representatives from 24 Islamic nations participated in the Islamic Nations' News Agencies Congress, which was arranged by the ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY and was convened with an opening address by Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit.

Two international Islamic news organizations, as well as the PALESTINE NEWS AGENCY (WAFA) are also represented at the congress.

The delegates to the Islamic Nations' News Agencies Congress, which began its deliberations in the conference hall of the Istanbul Technical University Mineral Sciences Faculty, are as follows:

Saftar Aliqyrashi, INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC NEWS AGENCY (IINA) General Director; Abdurrahman al-Shibly, SANA [SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY]-Syria; Omar Alem, SANA-Syria; Wahida Abdulrazzak, Editor, INA [IRAQI NEWS AGENCY]-Iraq; Emuhmoud M. Ahmad, Editor, INA; Ahmad Dashti, Assistant General Director, KUNA [KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY]-Kuwait; Saleh al-Padala, Editor, KUNA-Kuwait; Afif Abdulsamad, NNA [NATIONAL NEWS AGENCY]-Lebanon; Ibrahim Abu Jamaous, PALESTINE NEWS AGENCY (WAFA); Isam Sakmimi, General Director, UAZ - United Arab Emirates; Mohammad Abdulkarim Jaafer, Editor, QNA [QATAR NEWS AGENCY]-Qatar; Yahia al-Shukani, General Director, SABAA [Expansion unknown]-North Yemen; Algawy Omar, Aden and South Yemen; Sidi Quld Sheikh, General Director, NPA [Expansion unknown]-Mauritania; Suleyman Cagin, TAK [TURKISH NEWS AGENCY OF CYPRUS]-Turkish Federated State of Cyprus; Mimoun Chatty, TA [Expansion unknown]-Tunisia; Parviz Abadi, PANA [Expansion unknown]-Iran; Ahmad Bashir, General Director, APP [ASSOCIATED PRESS OF PAKISTAN]; Mohammad Rahar, General Director, ANTARA [INDONESIAN NEWS AGENCY]-Indonesia; Abul Hashem, General Director, BSS [BANGLADESH NEWS AGENCY]; Mohammad Benzeghiba, General Director, APS [ALGERIAN PRESS SERVICE]-Algeria; Lisaneddin Davoud.

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